


JPRS 78096

18 May 1981

East Europe Report

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1880



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Indexes to this report (by keyword, author, personal names, title and series) are available from Bell & Howell, Old Mansfield Road, Wooster, Ohio 44691.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

18 May 1981

EAST EUROPE REPORT
POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS
No. 1880

CONTENTS

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

'LISTY' Evaluates, Compares Hungary Versus CSSR (LISTY, Feb 80)	1
Romanian Review Criticizes Hungarian Orientalist Work (Editorial Report)	21

HUNGARY

National Interests, Workers' Interests, Dual Role of Unions Studied (Aladar Mod; TARSADALMI SZEMLE, Apr 81)	22
High School, College Entrance Exams To Be Revised (Gabor Novak; KOZNEVELES, Mar 81)	35

POLAND

Election System in Relegating Authority in Party Discussed (Edward Erasmus; ZYCIE PARTII, No 3, 1981)	37
Civil Defense Achievements, Plans Outlined (Various sources, various dates)	44
Annual Briefing of Key Personnel, by Grazyna Dembowska Comments by Civil Defense Chief, by Tadeusz Tuczapski Interview With OC Inspectorate Chief, Wolodzimierz Chrobot Interview	

Briefs Swedish Union Aids Solidarity	55
---	----

ROMANIA

Agreements With Foreign Countries Ratified, Published (Editorial Report)	56
---	----

Press Union Committee, Council of Journalists Elected (Editorial Report)	57
Journalism Review Accused of Violation of Ethics (PRESA NOASTRA, Dec 80)	58
Work Accidents Decrease in 1980 (Ilie Cisu; MUNCA, 9 Apr 81)	59

YUGOSLAVIA

Smajlovic Interviewed on Status, Role of Islam (Ahmed Smajlovic Interview; VJESNIK, 11 Apr 81)	60
---	----

'LISTY' EVALUATES, COMPARES HUNGARY VERSUS CSSR

Rome LISTY in Czech No 1, Feb 81 pp 50-60

[Article by OBS, Prague, entitled "Hungarian Silent Agreement"]

[Text] 1. Signatories and Critical Intellectuals

To judge a situation in a country by listening to the voices of the opposition can sometimes be misleading. However, in the case of an opposition which can, as a result of the forthcoming election, assume practical responsibility, its criticism of the situation will be much more realistic than that offered by an opposition which lacks a real chance or has no desire to influence anything from a position of strength. In politics we deal much less with the truth as such, the truth with a capital T, than with truth which can be realized. An isolated dissenter can be 100 times as right as a moralist, prophet, or philosopher, but he will not be right politically because of his isolation.

The weak opposition in Hungary is very far from being entrusted with practical responsibility and the next election will undoubtedly change nothing in this situation. After all, this opposition does not call itself "opposition." It does not call itself even "dissident." The term dissident seems to apply in Hungary to the several critics who have left Hungary in recent years. Hungarian opposition is at most expressed through intellectual criticism. And only a small number of critics sign various protests which, after all, are as scarce as hens' teeth. Significantly, such people in Hungary are called "signatories" (a literal translation from Hungarian), because they differ from the anonymous or semianonymous critics by opting for a tactic of openly addressing themselves to those in office or to those directly confronting them.

To judge the situation in Hungary by listening to the "signatories" and intellectual critics could thus be really misleading. In spite of that, we are determined to look at our neighbors who live south of Slovakia also through the eyes of these signatories and intellectual critics. We do that for three reasons: In the first place, a comparison of our opposition with that in Hungary is striking and provokes a number of questions. Secondly, if we are to report on what the Hungarians say and how they say it, we must also pay attention to their silence. Sometimes a critic's silence can be more expressive than his words. Finally, we cannot ignore relatively small and ineffective Hungarian criticism because Kadar's regime has specific reasons to act discretely and inconspicuously. It suppresses the full truth about the Hungarian reality or is silent not only because of those sad reasons

with which we in Czechoslovakia are so intimately familiar, but more often because the regime does not want any vocal publicity about its risky endeavor, which distinguishes Hungary more and more from our country.

It is symptomatic, and we will talk about this later, that the "signatories" have raised their voices only twice in recent years, and in both instances not in connection with any Hungarian problems, but with Czechoslovak problems. In January 1977 it was through a statement in which 34 intellectuals expressed their solidarity with Charter 77, and in the fall of last year when several protest declarations were drafted (in all signed by 250 people) opposing the verdicts against six members of the Committee for the Defense of the Persecuted. No other domestic or foreign problems have led to a desire to sign petitions in Hungary.

The reaction of the Hungarian authorities was nevertheless very moderate in both cases. There was no effort to discredit the "signatories" and no police involvement. A few "signatories" were expelled from the party and dismissed from their jobs. However, one must add that we are talking about such prestigious and influential jobs in science, universities, and the cultural field which in our country have for some time now been held by people who today would not be willing to sign anything other than a statement supporting the regime. Also, those Hungarians who lost their jobs were not bothered by the national committees or police with a request to immediately start to work as stokers or night guards. The majority of the "signatories", however, have faced no sanctions whatsoever and many of them continue to publish. Among those who were punished only a few individuals (Gyorgy and Maria Markus, Ferenc Feher, and the best known of them, Agnes Heller) left voluntarily or forcibly for the West without being deprived then or later of their citizenship and without being subject to public denunciations. On the contrary, the authorities publicly stated their regrets that the conflict had to end in this extreme way because at that moment there was no other way for either side in the controversy. Nothing suggests that these people cannot return to Hungary: Some can return immediately, others after a while.

After all, also leaving for the West, for a short trip or a longer stay, are those who make similar voluntary decisions: They go to the West to lecture, study, help themselves in their momentarily difficult economic situation, or just for pleasure. There are no practical limitations on their departures and they do return. They return because they can go abroad again. They can be in touch with the West even while staying at home. Their access to technical materials and literature and belles lettres is incomparably easier than in our country (Western newspapers, too, can be obtained, even if not at every newsstand). Some Hungarian authors publish books and articles in the West without losing the right to do so in their own country. Others do not hesitate to grant interviews to Western media.

If we wanted to estimate how many Budapest intellectuals (we would look in vain for them outside the capital) are involved in criticizing the Hungarian situation we have to be very, very cautious. The line between those critics who find themselves outside the official structure and those who are active within this structure is, according to all indications, more fuzzy than is the case in our own country. A number of samizdat texts are published under pseudonyms. This leads us to believe that their authors are people from "official" circles. To compare the Hungarian situation with our own is actually impossible: Hungary obviously pays no great attention to the number of those who are openly willing to sign petitions or texts

they write. It seems that the Hungarians appreciate the reality of the broad transmission belt between the "signatories" and the so far nameless individuals in responsible positions who give evidence of critical thinking.

There is no doubt that the number of titles of original or translated books and works circulated in Hungary in typewritten form is much smaller than in our country. But again, the value of this quantitative comparison is problematic. Certainly, individual writers have difficulties also in Hungary. Publishing houses are not willing to publish everything and immediately, without any change. However, a class of individuals who have been definitely blacklisted, which is so large in our country, simply does not exist in Hungary. And if we must type the latest work of the ecologist Lorenz, or other critics of ecological crises, or the latest works of Erich Fromm, then the Hungarians can in this respect save the effort and time of their translators and typists, and conserve paper: The above works are published officially, or they can easily be bought or borrowed from libraries in the original.

2. Freely Elected Attitude

We could say that at least from our point of view the number of Hungarian non-conformist critics who will not sign anything is probably smaller than in our country. However, this, too, may be true only in appearance. Or, in some less important sense it may be true, but does not tell the whole story. In Hungary, these critical intellectuals are critical through their own choice, while in Czechoslovakia many of them were simply forcefully expelled from the official structure and openly adopted their critical attitude only after they found out that they could not freely publish again or work in their own fields (we do not consider public self-criticism a realistic possibility that depends on us). Many people simply did not see any other decent possibility than to join those who among our southern neighbors are called "signatories." Hungarian critics always have better possibilities, and if they opt for open criticism we must give them credit.

"Better possibilities" for the Hungarian intellectual include not only a more liberal atmosphere at institutes of social sciences, a more tolerant editorial, literary, and general policy but, last and by no means least, also the possibility of being economically independent of the state as an employer. In our country the state has a monopoly in this respect. For a number of years Hungarians have resorted to the practice of keeping only a small core of personnel at the social science institutes, and of using contractors for a major part of their research activity. The contractors in turn do not have to hold down regular jobs. Thus, not only artists and publicists, but also sociologists, economists and historians can live in Hungary as self-employed persons. If their Czech or Slovak counterparts, totally surrounded by the creeping state's care, wonder how it is possible under such conditions that opposition in Hungary is so weak, it will be necessary to answer that the opposition is so "weak" precisely because existential worries on the part of the intellectuals are lacking in Hungary. This answer-hypothesis contains a realistic estimate according to which the intellectuals do not always care specifically about the general problems, the problems affecting all, but are interested in things affecting their own group, concretely in achieving optimal economic independence from the authorities. After all, even if intellectuals in Hungary lacked these specific possibilities of "external" existence, they would still be better off than the critical intellectuals in our country. At all times, even when it came to the worst, they would not need to beg the authorities for jobs as stokers or night guards. The existence of private enterprise in the services

sectors is, among other things, also the enclave of employer-employee freedom from state supervision and regulations. The telephone lines of the party cadres do not go so far. Our shadows, namely, personal files, stop at the borderline of this private world.

3. Sociography as Criticism

What are the topics touched upon by the Hungarian samizdat literature and how are they treated? Actually, we in Czechoslovakia should know the answer without reading anything from Hungary. In recent years, our television has shown several Hungarian movies which have been so characteristic that our views could not forget them. They were sober in such a way that they bordered on skepticism, as a matter of fact in such a way that they recalled the descriptive. They had no happy endings and there was no poeticizing or "beautifying" camera. On the whole, these movies were a form of ungratifying sociological reports rather than ambitious art. They depicted everyday life in Hungary with complete appreciation and a kind of understandable sadness. First of all, they lacked all illusions. Experts on Hungary watching these films certainly recalled the strong Hungarian tradition of the genre of sociological literature which was a specific form of opposition during the Horthy era. Since that time the Hungarians obviously have developed a need to observe and describe life (for example, the life of a specific social stratum) in its ordinary aspects, concrete details, and therefore without artifice, prejudice, or ideological bias.

The best known book of the Hungarian "dissident" Miklos Harasti, "Worker in a Workers' State," which was published in the West and resulted in the brief incarceration of the author, represents such a general sociographical report on the situation in the "Red Star" plant in Budapest. Thus, even Hungarian critics show less brilliant writing and more of their willingness to understand concrete social reality. They evidence less ideology and lyricism, overstatements and generalizations, and more realism. In other words, more of a bitter love for their neighbor.

However, such a genre is not a monopoly of the opposition. Official publishing houses, too, publish books (for example, a series entitled "Discovering Hungary") and articles concerning the social realities of contemporary Hungary. And even in this case the emphasis is more on detail and critical description than on ideological themes apologizing for the existing situation. In such cases, too, we can see an unusual relationship between the author and the topic--an understandable compassion for his fellow man, for an unknown and ordinary individual. On the whole, this is not light reading and does not provide a joyful view of the world. But the text, because of its truthfulness, makes the reader feel free.

4. Reverse of Prosperity

It is by now time to say something more general about the situation or mood in that country which, to the majority of Eastern visitors, is a miracle of normality, a longed-for consumers' paradise, a "socialism with a bourgeois face." In spite of all economic achievements which public representatives themselves view with a great deal of skepticism, however, in spite of political stability which transformed Janos Kadar into the most acceptable leader in the countries of realistic socialism, Hungary is also a country with an unusually large number of divorces, abortions, suicides, and alcoholics. It is also a country with an unusual declining birth rate and other social problems which do not testify to the sound moral health and

optimism of Hungarians. Such warning symptoms usually accompany a certain "type of fulfillment," namely, material satisfaction. We should say that it is with all probability satisfaction of the type which makes a virtue out of a necessity, with a feeling of unadmitted discomfort, possibly also with a guilty conscience related not only to forced, but sometimes voluntary, resignation toward more subtle values. We may say that this is satisfaction only on the level of daily life, without higher ideals or a voice from above (the reader can use quotation marks here if he wants)--satisfaction without transcendental questions which cannot always be answered in a routine way and which, because of this, keep man tuned to watchful humanity. It is satisfaction without the "luxury" of truth.

Hungarians live well, much better than before. Their only worry is for how long they will be able to sit in the saddle of the so far untamed horse of socialist prosperity. However, they live a lie. The basic problems of their country are taboo, not only because of a decision of the authorities, censorship, or the police, but because of a general silent consensus to the effect that it is better for Hungarians to keep their mouth shut. Considering the harsh reality of the Hungarian fall of 1956, and the threat of its repetition (and also in the face of the warning reality of present-day Czechoslovakia), it is the silence of responsible people. Facing real life, it is a cynical silence of conspirators bought for a dime.

We refuse to judge. We think, however, that this is the reason for a certain degree of weariness and cynicism, pessimism and skepticism characteristic of much of Hungarian artistic and publicist activity. Sensitive authors cannot ignore this ambiguity of the Hungarian "economic miracle." We would also say that they write about it without hysteria, but with the dignified equanimity of leading witnesses in the most developed country of the declining civilization of realistic socialism.

What, then, are the topics of Hungarian samizdat literature? The superficial view seems to suggest that economic problems are in the forefront of its attention--for example, problems of long-range economic reform in a situation which is constrained by an unchangeable political system. However, closer scrutiny will show that the samizdat literature deals with a much larger set of deeper problems which in the West are identified as problems relating to the "quality of life." This means a lifestyle rather than a living environment. These are the problems of a relatively sudden move toward a consumer society, growing social disparities (Hungary, for example, has its own "privileged" youth comparable to the youth in Western Europe), complicated generation gaps, differences between urban and rural areas, problems related to the effects of the private sector and the so-called secondary market on value preferences of the people conditioned in one way or another by socialist ideals. But there are also the unusually provocative problems of gypsies and, last but not least, the problems of a deteriorating living environment (for example, in the vicinity of Lake Balaton).

Let us not forget that Hungary is still in the period of a retarded civilization cycle. The transformation of an agrarian society surrounding one huge metropolis into an industrial, more or less "urban," society has resulted in sharp and often painful changes in traditional patterns of behavior. This manifests itself in large-scale migrations and phenomena such as the disruption of the traditional family and traditional community in general. Hungary's realistic socialism has been unable to face these disintegrative tendencies.

9. The Youngest New Left

Yes, you guessed it. The Hungarian critical intellectuals criticize the situation in their country primarily from a leftist position, from the position of some kind of a more original, more realistic, "pure" socialism. All these are, of course, adjectives which would create suspicion in our country. (In Hungary, one does not hear so far criticism from the conservative position. It is difficult for us to state that this is so because of communication problems, or because such critics do not exist at all.)

Among well known people nobody leaves the country with the exception of Marxist philosophers and sociologists, members of the so-called "Budapest school" who are all students of the important Hungarian Marxist philosopher of the Hegelian type, Gyorgy Lukacz, (1885-1971). The regime is criticized most sharply for its betrayal of the socialist ideal of equality, for permitting profit incentives, for its support of consumerism, and for the resulting alienation of individuals. Certain Western observers characterize the Hungarian critics as the "neoleft." In fact their similarity with the disappearing West European new left is more than superficial. The point of departure is a number of similar aspects (however different they may be as far as substance is concerned). The regime has the support of the "silent majority." What else can this majority do after all? The political system seems to be stabilized to such an extent that nobody questions its future. However, this is so because of the fear of Moscow rather than because the system reacts satisfactorily to changing domestic and foreign needs. Repression of political non-conformists is minimal. This is true not because the legal system would not allow it, but because the clever Kadar believes it would be foolish to do so... We think that this situation is a classic case for criticism. However, not criticism from the traditional "left," but rather from the "new left." At the same time we are aware of how different the situation in this respect is in our own country where the voices of the critics of the new left are practically lost in the noise, or more precisely, in the complaints of those who are dissatisfied and critical because of their "rightist" position or, even more, because they belong to that political forefront in which the people feel threatened in their most basic human needs.

The new left, without calling itself by this name in Hungary, is thus not an imported article from the West. It is an authentic manifestation of skepticism on the part of critical intellectuals who have seen through the illusion of possibilities of internationally isolated structural changes and who, at the same time, have courage to admit that nobody else supports them. They are considered by many to be faultfinders or provocateurs, not saviors (and they understand very well why they are not damning anything). However, they are not willing to blind their critical vision because of a communist-socialist ideal... Their texts are not easy to read. The authors themselves probably do not expect to be read by any other group than intellectuals. The system of protests, appeals, and manifestoes is totally alien to them. It also does not occur to them to appeal to Western public opinion. In this respect, they are realists who soberly and without much expectation try to eliminate the remaining ideological cliches and persuade the rest to see things more clearly than permitted under the more or less functioning and comfortable everyday ordinariness which seems to be free of both evil and good.

At the same time, they try to cope with Marxism and Marx with such seriousness that our domestic skeptics only roll their eyes. It occurs to us how cheaply our skeptic

can acquire his skepticism, how he becomes skeptical because of our hardened, ineffective regime not to mention its propagandists. Thanks to Lukacs and his school, Marxism in Hungary is understood primarily as a critical philosophy, somewhat less discredited than in the case in our own country. At the same time, it is a paradox that ideological battlefields are being abandoned at social science institutes. Marxism has become an uninvolved and formally perfect sophistry in Hungary.

This, however, does not mean that Marx and Marxism are gaining ground among the critics. An inquiry entitled "Marxism in its Fourth Decade" and a collection of essays entitled "Prophiles" demonstrate a growing skepticism especially among the younger generation vis-a-vis this doctrine of doctrines. However, even the most skeptical individuals consider Marxism as something which exists or existed, at least in the past, and which had some importance. In other words, they consider Marxism as a relevant reality which must be seriously dealt with and which should not be haughtily ignored.

6. Modus Vivendi vel Moriendi

Seventy percent of Hungarians are registered Catholics. The Catholic Church in Hungary was always powerful and rich in the past. After World War II, it hardened its attitude, refused even the compromises offered by the regime, and shut itself up in silent resistance. On its side, the regime expected that the "religious relics" of the past would quickly disappear.

In the end, the church and the regime were forced to discover reality. The church left its catacombs and, to use the words of its primate, appeals were made to the people living under realistic Hungarian socialism "with the Bible in one hand and the newspapers in the other."

The state and the church, in spite of (or perhaps because of) the fact that alienation between the two reached its maximum in the postwar years, are able on the whole today to find their own path in the dilemma which can be stated as follows: Either *modus vivendi* or *moriendi*; either coexistence or disappearance. (An official of the Roman curia characterized the negotiations conducted by the Holy See as negotiation for a "*modus vivendi*" in the case of Poland, "*modus vivendi vel moriendi*" in the case of Hungary, and "*modus moriendi*" in the case of Czechoslovakia...

An agreement with the Vatican was reached as far back as 1964. It was the Vatican's first agreement of its kind with an East European country. Prime Minister Lazar paid a visit to the Pope in 1975 and 2 years later Kadar trod the soil of the Vatican. The Esztergom archdiocese, which had been without an official spiritual pastor since 1948, was given its archbishop in the person of the Hungarian primate, Cardinal Lekai. Nobody tries to prevent regular contacts with Rome, the Catholic hierarchy in the country has no vacancies, and all bishoprics have their bishops. These things have not been achieved so far in Czechoslovakia (or, these things have so far been barred in our country). The situation, however, is worse in individual parishes where the number of priests is declining. The reason for this is among other things the fact that the priests themselves leave the priesthood. In spite of that, there are six seminaries in Hungary training young priests and what must be surprising to us, eight secondary schools with teachers from religious orders salaried by the state. Religious instruction at primary as well as secondary schools does not have to face the obstacles familiar in our own country. The state's

highest official in charge of religious affairs said in this connection that "our state considers as self-evident the fact that the free exercise of religion is not limited to participation in liturgical services." Our Czechoslovak state considers the exact opposite as self-evident.

All this is, after all, external trappings which do not have to prove a basic truth concerning the present situation in Hungary. We believe it is much more important to show how similarly or at least, not in a contradictory way, this spiritual climate is seen by the Archbishop on the one hand, and the Marxist sociologist (in the official journal VALOSAG) on the other. The identical view of temporal power and spiritual service (we do not have the courage to say spiritual "power") proves that the dialog which has developed in Hungary between these two is not only manifested by civil and correct relations between the "secretaries in charge of religious affairs" and the church hierarchy but that it also de facto represents a dialog concerning spiritual and ideological questions and, as stated by Tomas Nyiri, professor of philosophy at the Catholic Theological Academy in Budapest, results in practical cooperation in everyday life. Our own eyes do not want to believe what they read in black and white. However, our skepticism starts to disappear when we remind ourselves that the ideological struggle against "religious relics" is going on and that this "specific dialog", as stated by Nyiri, is not an institutionalized or organized dialog with broad publicity of a type which we experienced in the late 1960's.

Identical accents, in other words the understanding of the temporal power for values which cannot be eradicated by scientific means or created on the basis of goodwill from the volume of consumed goods and understanding on the part of the spiritual sector--in the past so powerful and rich, but today more humble and modest because of the contradictory reality of Hungarian socialism which is still open to humanistic prospects--this is what we consider the most optimistic part of our report on Hungary. When we see that both sides deal with many similar concerns our hopes are raised.

Archbishop Lekai speaks about a need for a return to the Cluny movement (a monastery in southern France) which in the early Middle Ages tried to reform the spiritual values of the European society of the 11th and 12th centuries which was succumbing to materialism. Lekai prays for the Hungarian Catholic Church to become a new Cluny. At the same time, he is not so naive as to insist that material poverty alone is the panacea or even the goal. He has in mind mainly the Hungarian youth which is critical and often over-sensitive and at the same time demonstrably cynical, showing contempt for all recognized values. Professor Nyiri meets the Marxists halfway in the sense that he admits the following: Yes, most of the critics of religion, including Marxist critics, do not blame Christians for following Jesus of Nazareth, but on the contrary for not following him, for betraying Jesus... And he does not complain when he says that in order to convey the Jesus message to others one does not need many latifundias, hospitals, monasteries, Catholic schools and other educational institutions, newspapers and publications. All these are owned by the Catholic church in many countries of the world and the results of its evangelical activity are exactly as small or great as they are in our country...

The following is a quotation from a recognized Marxist sociologist. We quote him more extensively and without any comment. "The disappearance of religious interest in small and large villages and even in the cities does not at all mean that the

materialist world point of view has been convincingly accepted. The abandonment of the Christian faith and of the church is not in many cases accompanied by enlightenment but, on the contrary, by ideological indifference and intellectual lack of interest. The result is the impoverishment of conscience and feeling. Hence, the decline of religious instruction and participation in church services can be considered only superficially as a positive phenomenon. No social system, not even the socialist one, can come to an understanding with people who do not want or are unable to think of their relations with society or the meaning of life. Any understanding with them is impossible because these people surround their own small and narrow worlds with barricades which do not open in any direction--not even in the direction of heaven. Their existence only demonstrates that they do not want to have anything in common with society or with one another."

But in the end there is one disturbing note: The position of other, mostly small, churches in Hungary is not good. Especially, the Methodists are being suppressed and persecuted. Hence, individuals in many instances opt for extreme methods of protest against the authorities. After all, the 1,000-year-old crown of St. Stephen has always represented a Catholic country...

7. Understanding the Regime

Contrary to our critical intellectuals, their Hungarian counterparts deal not only with Marxism, but they must deal in the first place with the regime which--with some exceptions--does not persecute them or punish them. This is a regime which, however, does not stupidly pretend that they do not exist either. This is perhaps because the authorities do not prescribe for them a priori hostile intentions and are not afraid of them as rivals. This situation evidences the external dilemma faced by critical intellectuals. And here their paths have always divided in the past and will divide in the future. Some of them will gradually increase their criticism until they surpass the limit beyond which the authorities will lose the possibility to be aware of this criticism and thus to tolerate it. And only then will such critics feel satisfied. Others will look primarily to see whether their criticism has changed things, even if slightly, for the better. And they will not care who is the one bringing the remedy and whether the authorities will or will not give them credit. At this time it is necessary to state that it is relatively easy to be a critic when one speaks in the air--in other words, in a situation when the authorities pretend not to hear and suppress all those who do not follow the official line and when the public cannot hear anything besides the loudspeakers.

A more difficult situation faces the critics when the minister of culture in their country answers questions the way they were answered by Imre Pozsgay in an unpleasantly intrusive interview broadcast in the fall of last year. A fellow countryman may try to imagine that our Gernade Klusak will talk in the same way. But such imagination is not possible...

"Cultural life brings us works, theatrical plays, films, and literature which openly deal with problems, human and social failures, historic sufferings, as well as future uncertainties. If we perceive them with ill will then we will believe that social ills are the results of such works, while in fact they only reflect them...these works express certain social feelings and not only the partial products of erroneous theories which of course also exist...it is not possible to confuse the uncovering of evil with the individual who does the uncovering because if we appear distorted in the mirror it will not be of any help to smash the

mirror.... I believe that one of the most important problems is the fact that our rivals, you called them the opposition, and others who approach our world with evil intentions are always on the alert to spotlight our disputes and difficulties. They are much more alert than we are because we are so involved in our own work and try to react to these disputes of ours since we are part of the system. To put it straight: I do not deny that our rivals disclose real problems. However, we, and I believe very much in this, who should answer their questions related to these problems, were somewhat slow in responding. We were not sufficiently equipped ideologically and theoretically and were not always able to speak persuasively..."

In another place for us the unbelievable minister of social
terizes the "rivals"--and then quickly also himself and his
circle--in this way: "...a social group of, perhaps, certa
sensitive to theory, who possess a critical and oppositiona

lucation charac-
ques in the ruling
le who are very
activity..."

"...we are interested more in practical deeds, we are responsible for a successful functioning of the system, for the realization of our specified goals."

Such a division of roles as seen and, at least, accepted in words by Pozsgay, we should consider as normal. On the one hand we see people who have power and have practical responsibility, and on the other hand those who, because they do not have such responsibility (perhaps because they do not want to have it), can see things in a broader context and compare the practical results with an ideal or a theory which necessarily leads them to be critical. Naturally, even they should have been responsible people. Their responsibility, however, is of a different type.

We said to ourselves: This we had to consider as an almost optimal situation. Do we not then consider this division of roles as such? We are not certain how the entire situation in Hungary has been changed and perhaps completely depreciated by the aforementioned complex of the most serious and at the same time taboo problems such as the unequal relations with the USSR, an undemocratic and at the same time immune political system, and an economy limited by a secret, because it is enforced, arms program... On the other hand, we cannot reemphasize enough that this taboo system is the result of a certain consensus, in other words that this taboo system is something which is only enforced on the people.

A social consensus is in the end a value in itself. It demonstrates the maturity of the Hungarian public and certain wisdom or, at least, the experience and cunning of the Hungarian leadership, and this perhaps regardless of what has been the object of the consensus or what has been made taboo. We doubt that we had achieved such a consensus in our country in 1968. Yes, we did experience a certain spontaneous unity. But this unity dealt with the question that we do not want to face any more. Then, everything had to be expressed and repeated loudly. Consensus over repeated slogans can be only a superficial consensus. A much more difficult, but a more permanent and politically more fruitful consensus, is the one which is more tacit, when it is not necessary to constantly guess one's thinking and the reasons for it and to do all this in full public view. We do not believe that it is only under conditions of repressive control in the countries of the Soviet bloc when such political style, based on consensus, is fruitful and hopeful. It always remains a style--a more mature attitude, involving fewer risks, because it opens the door to changes without ending in disasters.

8. The Year 1968

A fellow countryman usually thinks that the Hungarians, as far as that "silent consensus" is concerned, learned their lesson back in 1956. A close analysis, however, shows surprisingly that the Hungarians learned a better lesson--because they understood more--in August 1968. At that time they definitely learned how one should not treat realistic socialism. They learned which changes Moscow will simply not accept. Also, they learned how those changes which Moscow could accept should be carried out. But, most important they learned how important the political style is, including the official rhetoric which must try to gain the confidence of the public, but at the same time must not lose Moscow's benign trust. Obviously, the Hungarians have succeeded in finding such a style and working it out. And, so far nothing suggests that they could not at least partially use this style in the solution of even their very complex problems, especially in the economy, which they are facing right now.

We must, therefore, deal with an answer, which is popular in our country because it is an easy one and in fact it is an alibi-like answer to the question of how it is possible that specifically in Hungary, which in the past had so drastically rejected the communist regime, such a regime should win the confidence not only of Moscow, but also of the local public. Our position, which is already a stereotype, is that we obviously lacked the fatal experience of 1956. However, the Hungarian critical intellectuals point to our year 1968 as their year of awakening and basic inspiration. The "Prague Spring" or August 1968, student revolutions in the West and the first experience with Hungarian economic reform put a definite end to the illusion that the political system of what only later was called realistic socialism can be changed structurally by internal forces alone--in other words, separate from other countries in the Soviet sphere of influence. The explosion of hatred in the fall of 1956 remained only an unprepared tragedy which could teach, and in fact did teach, the regime a lesson. Those who are critical of the regime while maintaining the basic socialist orientation had no need to learn from this event and, as they themselves state, they did not learn any lesson. It was an extremely vivid event, which was neither preceded nor followed by any measure of intellectual activity. And thus, even after 1956 many people harbored illusions about the possibilities of a substantial transformation of the system if, for example, the future could guarantee that the "real enemies of socialism" of 1956 would not be permitted to play a role any longer. After the fall of 1968 one can only pretend to believe in these illusions. Thus, it is no accident that the "signatories" have in recent years let their opinions become known on two occasions, and in both cases they addressed themselves to the Czechoslovak events. It appears that they wanted to say the following: Thanks to your misfortune we now understand many things. You saved us from our mistakes. Naturally, you had to pay a price, also for us....

Critical intellectuals in Hungary cannot change the system because they do not see any real possibilities in this direction. They do not protest as our Chartists and VONS members do against the regime's arbitrariness, against repression, and violations of legality because nothing of this is a regular part of politics which is so reasonable and, in the first place, so generally accepted that a more systematic violation of laws would be absolutely redundant. These intellectuals today are determined to carefully and concretely watch, identify, analyze, and soberly evaluate social realities in their country. They organize nothing, they do not speak in terms of political programs because they know that at this moment not even the nucleus of a movement which could need such a program exists in the country.

9. The system and its Rough Edges

If the critical intellectuals do not even intend to change the system we must ask how it is possible that the situation in Hungary is nevertheless changing, that the Hungarian situation is increasingly different from that in Czechoslovakia.

In Hungary we do not deal with structural changes of the system, but rather with its modification. Hungary represents the flexible use of the possibilities of how to change the functioning of the same system, how to smooth down its rough edges. After all, the system itself stands and falls with the "leading role" (the power monopoly) of the communist party. And in Hungary this monopoly is not a problem. The leading role of the communist party is not endangered. And still there can be differences in the applications of the same principles. To our domestic skeptics who know in advance that the only thing to do is to ventilate the discontent more or less loudly and then only wait, these differences appear--depending on the arguments used in the discussion--to be either sharp or negligible. Those who see these differences as sharp argue in the following way: It would be a different story if we had the Hungarian situation here. Those who consider the differences to be negligible argue in the following way: The basis of the system is, after all, the same. Hence, we should not succumb to any illusions... It is truly senseless to argue over substance if there is not enough goodwill, courage, and also patience and ability to get rid of the shackles of the comfortable habit of our stagnation. This certainly applies to those people who have power, but not to them alone. (Everything in our country would be different if we only experienced the Polish situation here. However, the Polish situation in our country is more remote than the Hungarian one.)

So far it seems to be indisputable that the possibilities of a more individual arrangement of realistic socialism in the individual countries of the Soviet bloc have in recent years been increasing rather than decreasing provided that there is enough minimally harmonized will in individual countries. This applies so far only if that arrangement will change nothing about that unhappy substance. People, after all, live better in one place and worse in another (Denmark and perhaps Bolivia are after all also "basically" capitalist countries and still nobody would be willing to confuse them if it were up to one to choose where to live) and these are negligible differences truly only from the point of view of dogmatists who specialize in the definitions of substances.

And here we can see what an anomaly today's Czechoslovakia represents. Compared to Poland, Hungary, the GDR, and in a certain sense also to Romania, Czechoslovakia must appear as a country of millions of unhappy, deeply disillusioned, and skeptical people who, full of mutual distrust, stubbornly refuse all realistic, i.e., positive, alternatives, punishing themselves for the most varied and not always completely clear reasons, for the lost hopes of 1968, and for the subsequent years of immoral purges....

10. Undeclared Confidence

Kadar really is not the chief designer of a kind of "Hungarian model" and the Hungarians today certainly do not aspire to play a historic role of creator of a new system of socialism. The entire meaning of Hungary's silent success lies obviously in the fact that Kadar and the Hungarians, those in power as well as the

public, have gradually created for themselves some minimal, undeclared, and for this reason probably reliable working relations based on mutual agreement. Only on the basis of this very unsentimental agreement is it possible to utilize the existing and growing possibilities of how to make bearable that which is unbearable in its pure, ideological form, i.e., in those places where--as in our country--those with power and those without live under conditions of a cold civil war.

Hungarian socialism is thus a legitimate child of realistic socialism and remains such a child in spite of the participation of Western capital in the Hungarian economy (with the possibility of owning a majority share), in spite of a broad private sector in the sphere of services, overall liberal cultural policy, a tolerant attitude toward the critics of the regime, and extensive possibilities to travel to the West, in spite of the fact that in Hungary you do not see in public places slogans, pictures, and idiotic signs (which provoke only rage in you), in spite of a very high standard of living that includes all types of food (meat!) in large selection and sold without a hassle.

The understanding between the regime and the public, even if conditioned and based on skeptical calculations, is therefore that magic wand with which it is possible today to change a lot in the world of a stabilized, realistic socialism (i.e., Hungarian socialism, but not Polish socialism) without affecting the basis of the system. Only in this way can the entire thing succeed. Without a certain minimal mutual confidence all factors are taken in an impractical way by this aspect, some in order to ultimately exchange this basis for something better, and others to defend it against "counterrevolution."

11. Without Self-Deception

True, Kadar who was hated in the fall of 1956 (in contrast to Husak in 1969) consistently and quite unscrupulously liquidated or "normalized" the consequences of 1956. However, in doing so he opposed both extremes, the revisionists on the "right" and the Stalinists and dogmatists on the "left." But apart from that, Kadar was primarily patient and did not persistently demand that people engage publicly in self-criticism and retract what the public swore to uphold the day before.

At the beginning the repression was harsh and cruel (those sentenced to death who were not 18 years old yet had to wait for their execution until their birthday). Then it suddenly ended and the time of forgiveness arrived. A mass amnesty was declared in 1961 when, as a "leitmotif" of domestic policy, Kadar used a Lenin slogan topsy turvy, namely, "He who is not against us is with us." It did not take long for writers who spent 5 years in prison to be permitted once again to publish their books. While Kadar knew how to be heartless, he also knew when the time had arrived to say enough is enough. Since then he has known how to be tolerant.

Kadar has proved to be a realistic politician and a good psychologist. He has been building realistic socialism without illusions, including some which were not genuine. In our country, the regime tries in vain to build realistic socialism with the help of ideological hypocrisy. The latter, however, is unable to become reconciled with an everyday and pragmatic hypocrisy as the only functional motor for building realistic socialism. Perhaps this is a manifestation of some bad conscience on the part of those in power in the immoral phase of the normalization period. As a proof we would like to offer, for example, the lack of courage of

Husak and his colleagues in finally disclosing who were the most conscious elements in the country who "invited" the military forces to intervention in August 1968. Without the "invited" ones we would not today have the team which is in power in the country. In our country you can hear and read a lot about the hypocrisy of power (for example, Kuny and Simacka, just to recall the most recent authors on this topic). However, we also think that deliberate and specific hypocrisy do not work. When it is necessary to pretend anything in politics, when you cannot do it any other way, then such a pretense should be applied consistently. If possible, one should keep silent about a topic to be covered up. And even more, this applied to the means with which this cover-up is to be carried out. One should not force the others to take an oath of loyalty to this or that from time to time, to keep the people constantly on the alert, and to repeat to them things in the newspapers and television, slogans in our streets and squares and even in the middle of natural settings, as is done in our own country.

The fact that idealistic motivations have disappeared and the acceptance of sad and totally unsocialist characteristics in realistic socialism which, alas, permits the system to function to some extent--all this is tacitly accepted in Hungary. And when it is necessary to talk about this or that it is done without elaboration, soberly, without the use of loudspeakers in order not to provoke the people needlessly. Kadar and his regime are silent about certain things (and when it comes to the worst, they know how to be silent even when they talk) and perhaps it is in this respect that they differ from the administrators of malfunctioning realistic socialism in our country. In Czechoslovakia the regime believes (or clumsily pretends to believe) that the practical corrections of a socialist dream must constantly be masked by monstrous scaffoldings covered with red fabrics and containing slogans written in gold letters, stars, sickles, and other empty symbols.

If the regime wanted to improve its standing among the people overnight a little effort would suffice: To end talk about certain things, to stop repeatedly stepping--pardon the expression--into shit which one can, after all, circumvent, and to show at least a minimum of tact and stop provoking and humiliating the people needlessly. The case of Hungary demonstrates that this can be done and that one can live under such a system. No euphoria, no idealism, but at least a little bit of calm, civil behavior, and perhaps soundness and quality. And no hectic obsession, fear, or cultural wilderness. This would be socialism without flag-waving--genuine, realistic socialism.

However, it could also be socialism functioning as a transit station between shared silence and shared hope. In spite of all possible reservations regarding the Hungarian reality, it is not possible to deny that Hungary lives spiritually, that the creative potential of the nation has not been completely eliminated, that the society communicates, and that it is not completely atomized. After all, alternatives can be thought out and major changes can be drafted only under conditions of calm spiritual life.

12. Socialist Patriotism

The term "socialist patriotism" is part of the official vocabulary. While we may express skeptical surprise, this term applies to the Hungarian reality. Socialist patriotism is certainly a weak cup of tea in comparison with nationalism which, however, would be both intoxicating and destructive in Hungary. It would mean in the first round released hatred toward the Romanians (in view of the tense

relations between the USSR and Romania which are even publicly aired) who are harshly and openly checking the nationalist inclinations, of the 1.5-million-strong Hungarian minority in Transylvania. This would raise the issue of Czechoslovak policy toward the 600,000 Hungarians in southern Slovakia, a policy which is only one or two degrees more acceptable. All this would open the floodgates to historical resentment and hatred of the Russians and the USSR, and its consequences would be very bad. It would be the worst possible scenario. Nationalism, usually at least potentially negativist, is out of the question. (It is worth noting that some 200,000 Germans living in Hungary make full use of their ability to visit their relatives in the FRG. However, one cannot say that they are leaving Hungary en masse, even though they could do so more easily than the Germans living in Czechoslovakia. Obviously, these Germans do not fare badly in Hungary.)

Patriotism (not only in the form of some disciplined and softened nationalism) at first makes a virtue out of a necessity. However, after a while it can become the cement of a new loyalty toward one's own country (and thus not only vis-a-vis the regime), an expression of pride by the Hungarians not only in what they achieved in the past, but also in what they are achieving right now. For example, Kadar's leadership was and still is using patriotic arguments in its appeal to the non-party intelligentsia which it asks to cooperate and actively help in the building of Hungary, but also of socialism.... The shared patriotism is also a demonstration of a certain degree of legitimacy of Kadar's regime.

The Hungarians diligently cultivate their historic traditions and their pride in the specific contributions of their nation to Europe and especially to Central Europe. For this reason, they are intensively involved in ancient Hungarian history, namely, a period which most clearly demonstrates the Hungarian uniqueness. And they certainly are glad to hear the words of Vienna's Archbishop Konig: "Yes, it is possible that the Hungarians are the most European nation."

It seems that these efforts are already bearing fruit. When the U.S. Government decided not long ago to return the crown of St. Stephen to Hungary (shortly before the end of the war the Germans had smuggled the crown into that part of Austria which, after the war, became the U.S. Zone) as part of its policy of differentiation among Soviet bloc countries, this was meant as a reward for Hungary's effort not to be an unnecessarily zealous and servile Soviet satellite and for its observance of basic human rights. It was a first-class event, not only as far as the public was concerned, but we dare say also for Kadar. The exhibited jewels, whose ownership was always considered to be a necessary symbol of national sovereignty, became the focus of pilgrimage for millions of Hungarians who undoubtedly understood the reasons for which the crown had been returned, but discreetly kept silent.

We could understand respect for the venerable symbols of the 1,000-year-old statehood and sovereignty, for the symbols of past glory which also involve the contemporaries. However, we cannot understand the obvious satisfaction with which Hungarians accepted Bertalan Farkas' mission in space in a Soviet spaceship.

If we put aside the fact that unlike the effeminate and chubby Remek, Farkas is a good-looking and very Hungarian-looking congenial young man, the attitude of the Hungarians and their pride concerning this questionable achievement within the framework of the measured Soviet economic favor still remains puzzling if we seek the answer in the event alone. If, however, "positive nationalism" or socialist

patriotism has become some kind of a universally accepted attitude in Hungary, then such patriotism is seeking its own symbols at any cost, because without symbols collective identity usually does not take shape. And in a country of a pitifully realistic socialist situation the people will not reject a cosmonaut who, in the last analysis, had saved Hungary on the front in Baykonur. The object of pride is rather silly in this case. The pride itself, or a need for it, is not silly today.

We dare contend that Hungarian history is not as disrupted as Czechoslovak, and especially Czech, history. Or at least, that Hungarian history is not viewed as being so controversial. Characteristic of this is the existence of a number of important personalities in Hungarian cultural life who live and, in the first place, were publicly active under all "types of conditions," and who thus through their lives and work--which was in contrast to the fragmented and dramatic historical events--unified this history as a history which continued to be uniquely Hungarian.

This is related to the fact that the Hungarians in Hungary have always considered the entire Hungarian diaspora as part of themselves. Thus, not even the present Hungarian state does not needlessly aggravate possible conflicts with emigres (in 1956, the people who did the shooting in the streets left Hungary!) and is in touch with and takes care of all its countrymen in the world (naturally, we must understand that there are exceptions to this policy). By the way, there are many Hungarians abroad who have become famous. Thus, if Hungarians are not willing to downgrade their history into a number of broken fragments, then this thoughtful solidarity of theirs which transcends state borders is a practical result of the same patriotic attitude. To keep a small Hungary at the focus of all possible pressures and influences as a distinct unit and to maintain and advance this unit primarily as a Hungarian state.

13. De Facto Democracy?

The Hungarian political system is only slightly different from the Czechoslovak political system. While the Hungarians do not pretend to have phony political parties as we do in our country, the Hungarian voters have a chance in certain election districts to choose from among several candidates who, of course, are not nominated by them....

No country has so far constitutionally regulated public opinion polls. In this sense the polling of public opinion is not part of the political system in a general or specific sense. However, one can assert that the question as to who, when, and under what circumstances such opinion polls can be conducted and as to whether and how their results can or must be made public (and, also, how it is guaranteed that these results are not falsified) is increasingly becoming part of the political problem in the general sense, especially in view of the fact that the traditional democratic mechanisms are unable to register with sufficient flexibility and accuracy the rapidly changing preferences of the people. We are not familiar with the rules governing public opinion polls in Hungary, if there are any. However, we believe that these public opinion polls and the publication of their results fulfill the function of what we call "de facto democracy." These public opinion polls are conducted in Hungary more often than in Czechoslovakia. But, in the first place, they do not evade the somewhat more delicate issues (attitudes

toward Romanians, Russians, gypsies, and so on, and their results are broadly publicized. Certainly, we cannot know what has been swept under the rug. But in spite of that, these results can disclose something not only to the rulers, but also to the ruled. They inform the public about the existence of still unsolved problems, unfulfilled aspirations, and changes of values. Certainly, all this is only an "ersatz" for real democracy, but it is better than nothing.

Similarly, the mass communications media are much more daring than their counterparts in our country. In fact, in Czechoslovakia the mass media are not daring at all. In Hungary, members of the government are grilled by courageous radio and television editors in live broadcasts. In Hungary today programs are broadcast the likes of which we only dimly remember from before 1968 in our country, when we used to conduct "telephone interviews" live.

Moreover, interpellations in parliament are not at all such carefully arranged and staged charades as is the case in our country. Hungarian ministers certainly do not arrange for interpellations as an opportunity for self-congratulation.

The trade unions also have better opportunities in Hungary, perhaps because they have spoken up. We know of recent cases where Hungarian trade union organizations succeeded in having incompetent managers removed. The prerequisite for this, however, was the existence of certain criteria helping to prove such incompetence. And such criteria can be only criteria of a market character. In other words, nothing that applies to us again.

The more anything is possible in Hungary today the more the rest becomes taboo. Thus, for example, there is almost no discussion about the common problems of democracy in Hungary. While one can see a certain healthy spontaneity in the first sphere, he can also feel spontaneous self-reserve (meaning voluntary self-reserve) in the second. Naturally, all this must be qualified by the word "so far."

14. NEM

Not "nem tudom..." [I don't know] but "New Economic Mechanism." The latter is the modest title of the Hungarian economic reform which deliberately refuses to call itself a reform. It started a year before the "Prague Spring" and this name is characteristic primarily because of its lack of ideological ambition, but also its patience, pragmatism, and also total inconsistency. This is in spite of the fact that it is the most daring attempt of its type within the framework of the Soviet bloc. The results of the NEM can be seen by everybody in the market. Hungarians must also accept, however, unpleasantly rising prices. However, these are prices which have been able to "seek" their own level on the basis of demand and supply. These prices, even if steep, are the only chance for the entire Hungarian economy to find rational operational criteria sooner or later. And in the end the only result can be that at least some prices will go down.

Today, Hungary centers its efforts primarily on establishing itself in world markets, especially in the West, because in the East the Hungarians have no problems. This is a different situation from our own because we have problems even in the East. And none of this applies to industry alone. Hungary is the only country within the CEMA with an active agricultural sector!

In addition to Poland and Rumania, Hungary has been granted most-favored nation status by the United States. Obviously this too has made the regime cautious about the use of repressive methods vis-a-vis politically embarrassing individuals.

To this one must add the fact which we cannot really comprehend, namely, that Hungary does not have the type of multi-exchange rate system so familiar in Prague: What is the purchasing price and what is the selling price; and this applies to both Hungarian national enterprises and individuals who are ready to leave for the West and must purchase dollars. The deputy commercial directors in each Hungarian industrial enterprise trading with the outside world without the help of state "monopolies" must constantly keep on top of the exchange rate column in the Hungarian ECONOMIC NEWSPAPER because changes in exchange rates directly affect their enterprises, i.e., directly influence or have impact on the profitability of the enterprise's production. Hungarians not only permit foreign capital to be invested in their country, but they themselves invest their capital in the West! Anything similar for us sounds like something that may happen in the future, if ever. When the managers of the CKD plant start to pay the same attention to reports of foreign stock markets as they pay to gossip from the party secretariats, things will be better. Meanwhile it would behoove us to be worried about such a situation. For this reason Hungary does not have such an extensive foreign currency black market. And the significance of the Hungarian counterpart of our TUZEX is actually negligible for both the state and the consumer. In our country one has to humble himself even in front of those individuals who illegally exchange foreign currency and whom, for some time now, the regime pretends not to see. Possibly these people make more dollars than a large plant...

We do not have time to analyze the principles of the NEM and even less time to look into the complicated and often amended evolution of this "reform" which, after all, is only now entering a stage which will decide its success or failure. However, we want to say at least this: A characteristic feature of the NEM is the ever increasing independence of Hungarian enterprises, not only of state enterprises but also cooperative ones, which are permitted to have their own independent export and import policy. The state lends support to this activity. These enterprises are encouraged to compete among themselves especially in foreign markets, even if this competition is sometimes artificially created (when there was in the past only one producer of a certain product which had a monopoly).

A gradual but rather consistent elimination of state subsidies to unprofitable enterprises is related to the NEM. The likelihood for such a possibility is known well in advance, and those enterprises which lag behind can figure for themselves that they will end in bankruptcy unless they shape up. As a warning sign, not only managers but also employees of unprofitable enterprises must take severe cuts in salaries and bonuses. To make such a decision one needs courage and authority. An officially supported and guaranteed private sector operating in every field, whose units compete with one another for customers, is a real Alice in Wonderland for us. After all, thanks to this sector exclusively Hungary could afford to open its borders with neighboring Austria (for non-visa travel). Only a private sector can create a dense infrastructure of tourist services, including restaurants and hotels, able to accommodate such an influx of demanding foreigners. Naturally, Hungarians, too, benefit from this situation. And, one must remember that the private sector was practically liquidated at the end of the 1950's and in the early 1960's. It took some time before the people started to believe that the government was not setting snares for them and before they established their private firms.

The economic situation is, however, also characterized by a fatal shortage of manpower. We read about one large Budapest organization trying to attract cleaning women by promising them trips to the West.... Nobody in Hungary denies that this artificial and needless shortage, resulting from people not being where they should be, occurs simply because economic incentives are not strong enough. Prices, too, are constantly rising, as everybody expects.

Hungary possesses today a large stratum of technically qualified managers with a highly developed sense of loyalty not only to their own enterprises, but also to Hungary as an economic unit of the international division of labor. It is not the managers' professional or managerial qualification, but their ideological qualification which is today questioned by critical young intellectuals. To them the NEM seems often to step over the dead bodies of socialist ideals.

Politically, Hungary so far has been able to manage the rising prices. An extremely low-key propaganda warns the public in advance about forthcoming difficulties. The public is warned of the immediate consequences of not correcting past mistakes. At the same time, unlike Czechoslovakia, Hungarians do not emphasize primarily "external influence" as the basic causes of their failures. When after a while a price is raised, the people, while not accepting the hike with pleasure, do so in the belief that nothing else could be done and that, considering the existing circumstances, the price hike was inevitable from the very beginning. The leaders do not accuse the people of stealing and loafing, and on their part the people do not think that their leaders are totally corrupt and incompetent.

It is an indisputable fact that Hungary so far has the best track record in managing crisis situations in the entire Soviet sphere of influence. The reason for this is that the Hungarian leadership is, among all other Soviet bloc leadership groups, the least afraid of its own citizens. This is so because, in the first place, it is not directly backed by foreign bayonets and, in the second place, Hungarian citizens do not lack a priori confidence in their own leaders.

The gradual introduction of the NEM has been done in such a way as not to trigger certain political consequences. "Ideological sacraments" remain untouched and the external facade of the regime is not questioned. Changing the form of the political system is taboo. Only critical intellectuals would raise their voices when they ask whether such a reform can succeed without any change in the power structure. This provocative question can be answered by the regime silently by preparing and softening the "special technology of the political and ideological compromise which creates prerequisites for the adoption of necessary economic measures, such as price increases, rationalization,...."

"In our country and in Poland, where ideological pomposity linked the fate of the regime to the murderous pricing freeze, there is always the danger of an explosion of hatred against the party leadership."

"Kadar is not interested in publicity in either a positive or a negative way. If he is to succeed he must work silently, behind the scenes, and must understand that using big words and receiving applause on the open stage do not pay." (All three quotations are from the most recent manuscript by Milan Simecek.)

However, Kadar had to make the Hungarians understand all this at the beginning. He had to make them understand that those things in Hungary which so far cannot be rejected or changed in their foundations in the name of some kind of a more sincere, better intended, or even ideal socialism can nevertheless be gradually adjusted to a normal, nonidealistic European people in the 1970's and 1980's. He had to make it clear that through small changes one can effectively smooth the edges of a system which, because of its long period of moral stagnation, lost some of its flexibility. But it did not lose a certain ability to be reshaped. In other words, he had to persuade the Hungarians to believe that they can have hopes for the future and full stores right now.

15. A Crooked Mirror?

A look into the mirror of Hungarian realistic socialism shows us that Czechoslovakia is a country of sad proportions. Certain moods and ideas as well as our actions--and the lack of action in some cases--exist in our society and can appear as somewhat impractical, apolitical, and spasmodic. They appear to be linked more with the past than with the future--unless, of course, we blame a crooked mirror for such a picture.

Hungary affects us differently than Poland. It offers us an acceptable, even if an emergency, way out, or a transitional status. At the same time, we must be disquieted about the growing distance between our two "realistic socialisms." Facing this contradictory feeling we permit ourselves to spell out at least one but perhaps the basic "Hungarian lesson": Hungary has achieved everything in recent years as a result of a tacit agreement between the rulers who, incidentally, have learned how to accept that which normally is part of a decent regime, namely, responsibility, and those who are ruled but do not have to resign themselves to everything which is outside their personal interests. It is up to the rulers to create prerequisites for such an agreement. We emphasize that this is the Hungarian lesson. The Polish lesson will in all probability be quite different.

The chasm between the powerful and the powerless in our country is so wide that anything besides a tacit agreement is (if we really tried to have it) perhaps unthinkable. Words, which served as the ammunition in our cold civil war, so far have not led to any agreement. When there is nothing more in our arsenal (for example, strikes which are again being used in Poland), it is precisely words, unhappily pumped up by the gunpowder of ideology--although it is very damp gunpowder--or pumped up by the gunpowder of the arousal of personal prestige which makes it impossible to accept any positive signal across the chasm in any other way than as an offending lie and provocation. On top of that those in power are sending no positive signals and the powerless do not exercise more decisive pressure, enough to render it impossible for the regime to continue to play deaf mute. Thus, what we can see is only flying sparks or distant lightning. The atmosphere is stifling in our country.

It is a pity that for us the Hungarian language is so distant. It would pay to listen to its nuances.

(This text was written at the beginning of the summer of 1980, before the Polish events.)

ROMANIAN REVIEW CRITICIZES HUNGARIAN ORIENTALIST WORK

[Editorial Report] Bucharest REVISTA DE ISTORIE in Romanian February 1981, pp 363-371, a publication of the Academy of Social and Political Sciences of the Socialist Republic of Romania, contains a review by Mihail Guboglu of the following book: "Einführung in die persische Paläographie. 101 persische Dokumente. Aus dem Nachlass des Verfassers. (Introduction to Persian Paleography. 101 Persian Documents Left by the Author) edited by G. Hazai, Budapest, Academy of Sciences, 1977, published posthumously from the works of Hungarian Orientalist Lajos Fekete (1891-1969). The reviewer finds many errors in the book and says: "If Turkish historical bibliography was, in general, neglected in the book, Romanian bibliography was completely ignored. The obvious gaps and errors in this monumental publication cannot be covered over by the scientific authority of the scholar I. Fekete."

CSO: 2700/227

NATIONAL INTERESTS, WORKERS' INTERESTS, DUAL ROLE OF UNIONS STUDIED

Budapest TARSADALMI SZEMLE in Hungarian No 4, Apr 81 pp 32-43

[Article by Mrs Aladar Mod, candidate, special consultant: "National Interest--Workers Interest; Thoughts About the Trade Unions"]

[Text] In the time before us overcoming our economic difficulties means a great test for society as a whole. We will be able to go forward successfully in this if the broad strata of the populace recognize, primarily on the basis of their immediate experiences, that social interest, the uniting of society, coincides with their own interests. This recognition, however, does not come easily because social interest is very abstract, involves the social progress of the whole and prints in the direction of the future while the majority of individual men are motivated by present and immediate interests. And while this interest would require the greatest possible integration of society the strata, economic units and institutions standing at the various posts of the division of labor have immediate interests which differ to a significant degree, although they are not antagonistic, even in our society. Resolving this contradiction is never simple but it is especially difficult now when there is increased need for joint efforts serving the common interest in order to carry out the great task standing before us.

The existence of deviating separate interests does not necessarily stand in opposition to a uniform social interest for under appropriate circumstances their realization serves the national interest indirectly. But not even under the circumstances of socialist management are the different interests integrated automatically into national interest. To further this we must think in a new way in more than one thing and to a certain extent we must act in a new way. This process has begun. This article is intended to contribute with a few thoughts to the activity of the trade unions in this regard.

The interests of people, groups and strata--nationally and in individual places of work--coincide in part, differ in part and even run counter to one another. For this very reason not all interests can be realized. It is natural that those whose interests are realized find it easier to identify with the place of work, or with society, but one can hardly expect those for whom this is less true--frequently through no fault of their own--to be enthusiastic about the possible worsening of their situation. Still, one must build courageously on the supposition that the majority of working people will be able to judge their immediate

interests in the light of realities, will be able to understand and accept the given situation. But one will be able to count on this only if the possibility of interest realization is given for the majority of workers, only if they consider the differences just and justified. This is especially important today when income differences and the accompanying interest differences can be expected to increase between enterprises and plants and within them.

The trade unions have a great role in seeing that the differences in interest realization are accepted by the majority, by those affected more favorably and by those affected less favorably. It is not easy to do this. The difficulty lies in the fact that the task of our trade unions is, as is well known, a dual one. On the one hand it is to aid socialist economic construction and on the other hand it is to defend the unique workers' interests. These two tasks coincide in part and contradict one another in part. It is worth quoting Lenin in this connection: "There are numerous contradictions in the tasks of the trade unions....On the one hand their chief task is protection of the interests of the working masses in the most immediate and broadest sense of the word. On the other hand, as participants in state power and as builders of the entire people's economy they cannot refrain from exerting pressure....These contradictions are not accidental and it will not be possible to eliminate them for decades....Since it is absolutely necessary to increase the productivity of work in order to make every state enterprise profitable and deficit-free and since this unavoidably leads to an exaggerated emphasis on official interests and to official overzealousness certain interest conflicts will arise between the workers on the one hand and the directors of state enterprises or the superior authorities of these enterprises on the other." (Lenin: "Role and Tasks of the Trade Unions Under Conditions of the New Economic Policy; Draft Theses," Lenin's Collected Works, Vol 44, Kossuth Publishers, 1975, pp 339 and 333.)

Since the essence is the same despite the differing circumstances the crucial question today also, after roughly 60 years, is what emphasis to give in practice to each of these dual tasks, which are contradictory to a certain degree. There is no formula, equally valid for all times, for their balanced, concurrent realization but it is certain that the emphasis must change with changing circumstances. The activity of the trade unions in aiding production stood in the foreground with a disproportionate one-sidedness in our homeland for several decades. As a result there was a double organizational guarantee that the ownership interest would be represented, because guaranteeing production is the natural task of the economic leadership while there was far from being an adequate organizational guarantee of the interests of the employees, of the unique interests of the workers--which had to be opposed to the ownership interests. This created a relatively comfortable situation for the trade unions because representing enterprise interests appearing in the toga of a higher order "collective interest" (formulated by the leadership) was accompanied by much less conflict and responsibility than a defense of the individual or group interests of the workers (sometimes in opposition to the leadership).

It can be regarded as significant step forward that this one-sidedness of trade union activity is decreasing. A trend in this direction was shown unambiguously at the 24th trade union congress at which it was formulated as an important requirement that workers' interest representation and interest protection functions must

be strengthened. This represents new circumstances as compared to the earlier activity of the trade unions. At the same time, such a placing into the foreground of the interest protection function is far from meaning that we have gotten beyond the period of one-sidedness which has lasted up to now. It will be necessary to change a number of objective and subjective conditions still for the correct recognition and political requirement to become a driving force in practice, in everyday life. Let us mention a few of these.

Not too long ago not only was little said about the interest protection activity of the trade unions but it was not even accepted that individual workers (and worker groups) had separate interests. For a long time the reigning view was that identification with one's own place of work followed unconditionally and automatically from public ownership of the tools of production, from the fact that the workers were not only employees of but also, in this way, owners of the factory. It is now generally recognized that this latter fact is not enough in itself for identification with the higher order interest, primarily because in practice the workers can realize the more important functions of ownership, decision making, only in a relatively narrow sphere. And it is decision making which carries in itself the possibility of realizing differing interests. Recognizing the existence of separate interests is one theoretical condition for the requirement that a protection of workers' interests should receive greater weight in trade union activity. But in my opinion this also requires the gradual spread of a further theoretical viewpoint.

One can find in a broad sphere today an attempt to characterize the modern activity of the trade unions with various epithets which evoke much debate--"free," "independent," "self-governing." Under our social circumstances these epithets--as they are used by bourgeois ideology--are not appropriate to the activity of the trade unions because they express a sort of "standing outside" opposed to the program of socialist construction itself, they deny cooperation with the state and social forces building socialism. Under our socialist conditions, naturally, the trade unions cannot ignore the fundamental common interest of society, cannot fail to participate in the development of a synthesis of the various interests on this basis or fail to take responsibility for the compromises thus reached. On the other hand compromises which will serve the interest of society can be developed only via the clash of various interests at work in society and the coming into being of these compromises requires the existence of organizational representatives of the various interests.

Within this framework the function of the trade unions is not to duplicate that which is represented by the economic leadership. Primarily they must support the interests which are common, and there are plenty of these because it is in the interest of both the economic leadership and the workers that the conditions for work (materials, tools, etc.) be provided, that there be a suitable division of labor, that organization improve and many other things which, taken together, will make it possible for the workers to express in their work their creative abilities to the benefit of themselves, the factory and the public in general. At the same time their task also requires that, in part, they represent something different from the economic leadership. And this something different--whatever we call it--necessarily involves opposition, an element of independence. Thus, in my opinion, the epithets are of less significance and the significance of the actual content is substantially greater.

But what requirement does this content represent in our circumstances? In our homeland the trade unions, like every important force, must serve the social, the national interest. To do this two things must be kept in mind. On the one hand that this long-range goal should not force permanently into the background the immediate interests of significant strata or groups of society which can be felt at a given time, because this would endanger the realization of the social interest itself. The other thing is that going beyond the large general trends pointing toward the future there is no social interest which can be defined uniformly, in detail, and concretely in advance for every enterprise. It is true here, for example, that increasing efficiency in harmony with national interests and a flexible accommodation to external and internal needs represent, for the most part, interests of the economic units themselves too but the individual enterprises try to approach this uniform goal in different ways, naturally, on the basis of their concrete conditions. So just as there is no social interest defined in advance within the general trends pointing toward the future so also there is no factory interest which can be defined only in one way--various alternatives of this are possible also.

And this is what requires something different from the trade unions, something new as opposed to previous practice. Up to now, essentially, the enterprise interest formulated by the economic leadership appeared as the interest of "the collective" and they expected the trade unions to support this in general. So what must be changed is not the representation of the enterprise interest but rather that of a common interest which takes into consideration to a substantially greater degree than heretofore the worker interests appearing in the factories, in addition to--and sometimes opposed to--that formulated by the economic leadership. In practice this most commonly means a compromise which will be "good" if it approximates as well as possible the interests of society as a whole in major aspects but in such a way that the majority of the workers find it acceptable in itself. In this way--and in this way only--can the trade unions properly satisfy their dual task, constituting a unity, of aiding socialist construction and representing the interests of their own workers, because the optimal realization of the national interest can develop out of the factory interests only when they are developed in this way.

The recent graduated expansion of the sphere of authority of trade union stewards provides a good opportunity for filling the changed role of the trade unions. The stewards are the ones who know the problems of the workers, not "in general" but concretely, the problems of their own groups within the factory and beyond, and thus are most suitable for voicing them. Although the expansion of the sphere of authority of the stewards began earlier the result of this is still relatively intangible in practice. This is no wonder because their job is not an easy one; they must represent the interests of individuals and groups while most frequently the interests of any of these can be realized only at the expense of the interests of others because in a number of cases interest conflicts arise not only between leaders and subordinates but rather, as a result of the multiplicity of the circumstances of the workers, among the employees, among the workers themselves.

Certainly a number of good examples can be found showing that the stewards are gradually growing up to their new tasks but there is food for thought in what can be read in a report in the 25 January 1981 issue of NEPSZAVA about a session of

the trade union stewards' body at the bridge building enterprise. According to this 150 officials travelling from various parts of the country were to express their opinion not only about the general enterprise plan but also about the principles of wage development and about ideas serving to improve the living and working conditions at bridge building—but such opinions were not expressed. When the reporter asked why he had not spoken up one steward said: "Please ask my boss—he is sitting back there. I cannot judge these things... The boys sent me here to open my ears, not my mouth..." but he did not take even this very seriously, as is shown by his answer to the question about what those who sent him would say back home: "It was a waste to go to Pest to vote..." According to a deputy chief steward the chief observation was realistic because "in the present situation it is useless to protest." And the explanation of the silence given by the director is not without interest. According to him "the complicated questions of wage and management or of the wage level are based on such specialized information that today the man who can count on its acceptance by the stewards in good faith can scarcely try to get them to understand the minute details of what is being presented to them."

The quoted words would not lead us to permit us to believe that they are giving a picture of a unique extreme case and not of a rather general situation. It is natural that the fitness for public life activity which the increased tasks of the stewards require is not found ready-made in individual people; even in the event of the best intentions and the best natural qualities this can be tempered only in the furnace of action, and a good number of the stewards have yet to acquire this practice because in the past not only was such behavior and activity not required of them but there was virtually no opportunity for it.

If that for the talk has been primarily about the trade unions and about the stewards it would be wrong to imagine that carrying out the new task coming into the foreground in the new situation depends on the stewards alone. In the past and now also the trade unions have only as much weight as is conferred on them by the workers, by the working people represented by them. Because if the trade unions are participants in the power they can get their true strength not from the state organs conceding this power but rather primarily from the workers directly. Nothing can make them capable of carrying out worthwhile, interest representation activity if they do not have behind them a living, unceasing, modern movement of those that are called upon to represent.

So if the trade unions do in represent the workers' interests better than they have been another step is needed still—that the workers, the working people, themselves give more responsibility to their own demands than they have been doing. And if the change in emphasis is a new thing for us now in the tasks of the trade unions perhaps it is no new thing thing that this should be accompanied by a greater independence of the workers themselves.

In principle the political conditions for this exist in our society but in practice there has been, in part, too much and, in part, too little opportunity for the realization of this independence. For a long time the living conditions of a significant part of the workers gradually improved within the framework of economic development. In general it did not seem necessary for them to take action themselves in defense of their own interests. "Everything is decided up above, I don't have to

(I can't?) do anything." It hardly needs saying how harmful such a view is, a view which still tends to survive, when independently thinking, active, initiative-taking people are needed at every post in society.

Naturally this does not mean that there is not today or that there was not in the past such a thing as worker public opinion. But frequently this was expressed not in official places but rather in the corridors after the conferences, on the way home or where they got together to relax after work. And naturally there were and there are those who did not wait and do not wait for organized interest representation but rather sought with more or less success to realize their own interests themselves in various ways depending on their position and their ability to realize interests. But just because this takes place for the most part by avoiding publicity it can easily happen that the demands of the few satisfied in this way are not only opposed to the true enterprise interest--and indirectly to the social interest--but also can be realized only at the expense of the just demands of other worker groups.

Those worker demands which, even under these circumstances, do appear at the public forums of factory democracy can easily be put off, since they frequently do not find organized support in the trade unions, by citing higher order interests. And even if it is obligatory for everything "raised" on the various occasions of factory democracy to receive an answer the answers rather frequently are formal ones so that the workers--finding that nothing happens--finally get bored with constantly voicing their problems; in most cases they "come to see" that they must take cognizance of the outcome, namely that it is "impossible."

In the period ahead of us we must reckon with the fact that in the course of overcoming our economic difficulties it can be expected that more significant worker strata will get into a situation where they will be much less satisfied than heretofore with the "that's the way it is" situation. This means that the higher political recognition pertaining to a change in the task of the trade unions will probably coincide with a similar demand coming from below, from those directly affected, which may give rise to hope for a healthy change.

Letting the workers have a say--letting them participate--in forming the operations of factories has gradually gained ground since World War II not only here but also in the developed capitalist countries of Europe. In this connection it is justly noted that as a result of the difference in our social systems there is a basic difference between worker participation there and factory democracy under our circumstances. What is most frequently emphasized is that there this is only a tool to ensure the undisturbed conduct of capitalist production, to defuse conflicts. It is certain that this is the chief motive from the capitalist side, but it is not the only one. (Although the various worker participation organizations in capitalist countries are far from being the same as trade union organs everywhere we will refer to what follows, for the sake of simplicity, to them as trade union organs in general.) So it is unfortunate that it is virtually only the differences which are mentioned and that the many essential similarities are ignored. It would do no harm if more were said about these because in one way or another the experiences there might offer a basis for drawing certain conclusions even here.

The role of the trade unions is historically changing not only in connection with changes in the social system but also within the capitalist social system itself. Earlier they had to struggle primarily against starvation wages and for a shortening of work time; but with economic development and the increase in prosperity new worker interests gradually appear along with these basic ones (for example, variety of work, well ordered working conditions, a good place of work atmosphere, etc.) and the trade unions gradually have to reckon with a representation of these demands also.

The latter, however, represent not only worker demands but also they coincide, within certain frameworks, with demands by the capitalists too. Earlier, to a certain degree, the requirements of capitalist production made the introduction of basic popular education and general requirement. Now certain higher requirements are appearing. Instead of workers carrying out mechanical activity on the assembly line economical production now requires to an increasing degree workers who think and act independently and who thus consciously cooperate with the owners of the factory in solving the tasks standing before them. For the time being this involves a relatively narrow stratum of workers--although they must certainly reckon with this in the long run--and what the capitalists need primarily is a much broader sphere of "cooperating" workers in order to ensure the undisturbed course of production and optimal conditions for them.

And they can count on the trade unions in this because even though the preservation of the capitalist system stands opposed to the long-range interests of the workers the advantages deriving from participation do correspond, within certain frameworks, to the daily interests of the workers. The prosperity of capitalist society certainly improves, if not proportionally, the living circumstances of the workers, ensures better earnings possibilities, decreases the danger of unemployment and creates a more secure living. But while the trade unions, under capitalist conditions, are contributing to the efficiency of production and management they can do this only if they also carry out their traditional task--protection of immediate and fundamental worker interests. If they did not do this they would lose the trust of the workers and thus their usefulness to the capitalists also. Thus--serving different long-range goals--the trade unions have a dual task even under capitalist production relationships.

In our socialist society--on the soil of a true social interest--the trade unions should all the more do everything to avoid jolts in production and to ensure the undisturbed conduct thereof. And here this demands not less but to an increased degree the satisfaction of real worker demands--not to "defuse" conflicts which may arise but rather to actually resolve them. We do not yet have sufficient experience to determine precisely with what methods and within what organizational forms this can and must be done and to a large extent the development of concrete solutions awaits the future (although it has already begun). But only in such a process can we get to the point where the workers are not only passive observers and executors of tasks posted by the social and state leadership but themselves take a worthy part in formulating the concrete goals and immediate tasks of socialist construction, expressing in this connection their real needs and expectations.

Realizing this will bring a certain change in the relations of workers and leaders in internal enterprise power relationships also. Naturally this does not mean that the workers will force the economic leadership into the background because this leadership is responsible for that part of the all-social property entrusted to it. But it does mean that the workers will have an increased say in the development of their work, working conditions and working environment; that is, the place of work will increasingly become the arena in which the workers exercise power directly.

Power means making decisions. Thus the exercise of local workers' power means that the workers participate in a worthy manner in deciding questions affecting the enterprises and their work. They can have a say directly primarily in questions falling within their "effective range"--and at our present level of development this is a goal which can be reached more quickly and more easily--but through their representatives they will gradually take part in making broader range decisions affecting the enterprise as a whole. But in both the first and second case this can involve only those decisions for which they have sufficient understanding and overview, not only in principle but in practice also. Without this their participation would give birth to a formalism and would hold back development rather than carry it forward. Only in the possession of adequate information can the workers and their organized representatives change from mere "assistants" into really cooperating--and if necessary debating--partners of the economic leadership. This is an indispensable element of progress.

It follows unambiguously from what has been said thus far that an accommodation to the changed circumstances cannot be expected overnight from either the trade unions or the workers. Even today broad strata of the workers are rather frequently better able to judge the problems of their narrower working environment (at least from their own viewpoint, from the side of their interests) than are the much better trained and more learned strata standing above them in the hierarchy, but for a significant part of them the problems of the enterprise as a whole are baffling and unintelligible. And this is the result not of their individual abilities or frequently even of their training but rather of the position they occupy in production. What is more, when an attempt is made at production conferences to provide them with general enterprise information they most frequently listen passively. And at such times the judgment is generally quickly made: "This does not interest the workers."

It is true that this is frequently so--but this is because the information is prepared one-sidedly from the viewpoint of the enterprise. The workers can hear about how fulfillment of the plan is going, what the enterprise has done thus far in the interest of this and what remains to be done. But it would probably interest the workers more if on such occasions they were given a picture about problems at the places of work, the obstacles to development and the alternatives for resolving them, primarily from the viewpoint of what this means to them. In this way at least the more developed part of the workers would better understand the relationship between their own individual interests, enterprise interests and social, national interests and thus would see more clearly their own role and duties.

But if this is one indispensable condition for success it is not the only one, because the realization of the various interests depends only in part on the factories themselves. The innumerable dysfunctional phenomena which can be found

in virtually every area of the social division of labor put limits on what can be accomplished by the workers and working collectives, by leaders and employees. To mention only the most general ones--the everyday problems of cooperation among enterprises, the difficulties of material supply and the delays in carrying out investments depend in large part not on the individual enterprises but primarily on the overall functioning of the economy, what we might call environmental conditions. Thus, for example, it is true that the enterprises have at their disposal a certain part of the funds serving investments of priority significance and thus in principle the workers could exercise, through the trade unions, a certain influence on their use. But it is also well known to what a large extent this depends on social and economic relationships outside the given enterprise.

Naturally the workers are not able to judge adequately these complex interdependencies. Since only the immediate, palpable consequences appear for them it is self-evident that the only demands they can voice are: "organize work better," "provide material," "don't let new equipment lie in the courtyard for months." But since they are the ones who suffer first for everything--directly or indirectly--even if a solution is not their task but rather that of the leadership, it is still very important that the workers, the working people and their organized representatives, should have a say in regard to harmful phenomena because this can contribute to accelerating progress based on the joint efforts of the enterprise and central guidance.

Strengthening workers' interest representation in the activity of the trade unions is a command of the age today. But the question arises: To what extent is it justified, just now in our more difficult economic situation, to demand for them more scope than heretofore? Because there can be no doubt that objectively it would be easier to satisfy the just demands of the workers in a better economic situation.

Let us take as an example the most immediate worker interest, the question of the level of earnings, of differences in earnings. At the 12th party congress Gyorgy Lazar mentioned this as an essential condition of our progress: "Those working collectives and individuals who want to and are able to grow up to the higher requirements should get greater material and moral recognition." This "will produce more clashes between social, group and individual interests than we met with earlier. We must accept this but--especially if they affect human fates--we must resolve them in a socialist manner." It is not easy to accept "clashes" in general but it is especially difficult today. If differentiation must take place while maintaining the average level of real income then the merited income increases for some strata can be realized only at the price of decreasing the income of others. This is an even more complicated question, because not infrequently the weaker performance can come about because of causes outside of those involved.

And this is only one example. In the course of overcoming our economic difficulties the satisfaction of worker demands will be made difficult by another factor in addition to maintaining at the present level the standard of living--in essence material consumption and the real income needed for this. This even more important factor is one much mentioned in regard to the new requirements of the new situation--the regrouping of manpower. Full employment is a value which our

society has pledged itself to. But employment security cannot mean that everyone can do the same work in the same place as before. It is frequently said that the goal today is not to abolish uneconomical enterprises but rather to make them viable. They receive much aid to this end also but this process itself may frequently be accompanied by reorganization, a change in profile and the regrouping of manpower which accompanies all this. It hardly needs explaining that those directly affected, and there are not a few of them, will live through this process with bitterness from the most varied individual or family, material or moral viewpoints. All the more so because the great majority of job changes in the past two decades have been initiated solely by the employees, who achieved in this way--not infrequently at the expense of the social interest--a better realization of their individual interests.

Under capitalist conditions--where the closing of factories or the larger scale firing of employees takes place to serve capitalist interests--this not infrequently evoked worker protests, the occupation of the factories to be closed or strikes organized by the trade unions. In our homeland where in the final analysis the changes are in the common interest, similar action by the workers or the trade unions representing them are not justified. But this does not mean that the trade unions have nothing to do in this area. They have the task, indeed the obligation, to do everything on their own part to see that this process causes the least possible pain to the workers, to see that it takes place in such a way that the workers understand it and that even those affected should accept it as a necessary solution and relatively the best solution. And this can happen only if the place of work collectives participate appropriately, in part directly and in part through their trade union interest representatives, in developing the methods of change.

All of this underscores the fact that giving increased weight to the defense of workers' interests within the dual task of the trade unions means an increased difficulty in the difficult economic situation. And yet we must go forward, partly because there is an increased need for this function and partly because the increasingly difficult circumstances will, in part, facilitate progress in this direction.

What is it that will have a facilitating effect? In the first place the pressure itself. The necessary change will mean many difficulties and trials for those who are called upon to play a significant role in its practical realization. And difficulties will be undertaken--if we ignore a narrow, aware stratum--by those affected only if they cannot be avoided. And the pressure, simply as a result of our economic situation, is stronger today than ever before. The development of factory democracy is a good example of this. For a long time one of the chief obstacles to this was, as Lajos Hethy writes, that for the economic leadership "it frequently appeared to be a burden from which there was little profit, if any at all... (because)... the leaders interested in the effectiveness of production or of management had at their disposal numerous other more reliable action alternatives, involving less trouble and investment, with which to improve enterprise indexes than the development of factory or place of work democracy." There can be no doubt that this significantly contributed to the fact that the development of factory democracy remained largely in the sphere of political requirements and the economic leaders--if they could not openly deny it--gave it scope in practice within such formal frameworks that they rather hindered than aided an actual unfolding of it.

In the meantime, however, a process of change began. Today the requirements being made of the economic leaders and of the factories led by them are gradually changing. In the last few years, partly as a result of external circumstances and partly as a result of our internal problems, we have had to carry out tasks in the interest of improving our economic situation which clearly required that we change our previous methods--in essence we must achieve greater enterprise initiative and activity and a better harmony of enterprise independence and central guidance.

Certainly there has already been some progress on this road but there are still many factors limiting the independence of the enterprises on the one hand and, on the other hand, many opportunities for them to get out of living with the consequences of their actions. To the extent that this economic pressure can be felt factory democracy will become for the economic leadership not a superfluous burden but rather an indispensable factor--and parallel with this it will emerge from the sphere of political recognition into the everyday practice of economic life. Because the economic leadership will really be forced to pay attention--in the short run perhaps the detriment of their own immediate interests--to the real needs of the workers only when ensuring the efficiency and undisturbed nature of production becomes one of their basic interests.

But paying better attention to worker demands is only one side of that effect which pressure exercises on factory democracy. It is no less important that this same pressure will also encourage the economic leadership to support itself much more than heretofore on the conscious cooperation of the workers in solving the tasks standing before the factory, to recognize that reserve which the worthy participation of the workers means in the development of the tasks themselves and in developing the best solutions for them. Thus the pressure created by economic tasks may contribute to factory democracy--a forum devoted to the contradictory and yet unified cooperation of the leadership and the employees--becoming a real and significant factor in economic and social development.

Every participant in this process will have to "learn" and it is a peculiarity of this that the necessary knowledge can be mastered primarily in the course of practice. The economic leadership must learn that there is a need for a certain shift in regard to the share of participation in their exercise of decision making; they must learn to pay better attention to realistic worker demands and to draw from that source which is offered by the possibilities of action unity which can be achieved in this way. But the factory trade union activists, primarily the stewards, must learn also. They must learn which of the various--partly contradictory--demands of the workers they can undertake to represent and if they do then they must learn how to stand up consistently for these demands and how to bear the accompanying tensions. They must also learn how far they can go in their function without falling under the spell of those who made irresponsible demands, without breaking away from the majority of the workers. And finally they must learn how one can and must persuade the decisive majority of the workers to accept--or at least take cognizance of--the compromises achieved.

In his day Lenin considered it necessary to draw two practical conclusions from the new situation of the trade unions: "The first is that for the trade unions to work effectively it is not sufficient for them to understand their tasks correctly;

their correct structure is not sufficient; what is needed in addition is a special sense of how to approach the masses in a suitable way in every single concrete case and to see that these masses, with the least possible friction, rise higher by one step in cultural, economic and political respects. The other conclusion is that the contradictions mentioned will lead unavoidably to clashes, a lack of harmony, friction, etc." (Lenin, op cit, pp 339-340.)

And finally the workers must learn that sort of modern independence as a result of which they can achieve an ever better unity and combined fulfillment of both their ownership and employee status. An important precondition for all this is a political atmosphere in which the democracy of everyday life can expand and deepen step by step in practice in accordance with our unique circumstances.

Our economic problems will not remain in the sphere of the economy in the narrow sense but rather will necessarily irradiate social life as well; they may become a source of social tensions. It is certain that the populace will bear relatively well the transitional material difficulties if, in their judgment, distribution is just within the narrower possibilities and if they feel that there will be an improvement in the situation within a foreseeable time, one which involves an improvement in their own standard of living also. But this can be achieved only if the broad strata of the workers and the working people are not mere victims of but also themselves formers of events. Because the standard of living--essentially and primarily material consumption--even if it is of primary importance is not the only element of a much broader way of life which really defines social public feeling; it includes all the regular activity of people, all those links and relationships amidst which multifaceted human activity takes place.

Although work and life outside of work, social and private life and family and public life are in a close unity in the way of life it may seem permissible, since what is involved here concretely is the overcoming of economic difficulties, to stress work and working conditions--not forgetting the importance of the other factors. But just as a consequence of the unbreakable unity of the various elements of the way of life it is easier to bear the relatively less favorable material circumstances if the workers can regard their work as their own affair and thus find a certain satisfaction in it; it is a precondition for this that in the sphere within their view, primarily in questions affecting them directly, they should be able to participate in deciding the affairs of the factories and their own affairs, if they can give sense and significance to their own work. Thus under even more difficult material circumstances social public feeling may improve with the real development of public life spirit.

Much has been done already to ease the urgent problems of our economic situation. But even with this we are far from having adapted adequately to the new requirements of the new situation, because that requires many new things indeed, primarily a better utilization of our intellectual resources. And when we say this we are far from thinking only of the activity of the intellectuals, because every manifestation of creative participation, of an active desire to improve things and of the practical search for ways to facilitate this offer intellectual strength, whether we are speaking of workers doing intellectual work or physical work. This can be achieved only through the practical experiences, the intellectual and emotional experience of the masses, on the path of an ever broader, ever truer democracy, including primarily in this context real factory democracy.

The struggle being waged for progress on this path cannot only improve the public feeling of our own society but could also, even with our difficulties, exercise an increasing attraction on other peoples struggling for progress under other circumstances. And to this extent the defense of our true national interest coincides fully with the interests of international progress as well.

8984

CSO: 2500/217

HUNGARY

HIGH SCHOOL, COLLEGE ENTRANCE EXAMS TO BE REVISED

Budapest KOZNEVELES in Hungarian No 12, Mar 81 p 9

[Article by Gabor Novak: "High School Final Examinations and the College Entrance Exams To Be Revised"]

[Text] As revealed in a press conference at the Ministry of Culture on March 2nd, starting next year the Ministry intends to modify the system of its high school final exams, as well as its college entrance examinations. Initially, the new exams will be introduced at only a few technical high schools, but by 1983, at all technical trade schools and classical as well.

According to the regulations, the final high school examinations will encompass six fields. In the classical high schools these obligatory fields will include Hungarian language and literature (in national minority schools also their respective national languages), mathematics, history, physics, and a foreign language. The sixth field will be an elective from one of the following: biology, chemistry, geography or a second foreign language. Of course, one who has specialized in music and voice or in physical education, and intends to continue in those fields, will be able to choose one of those subjects as his sixth examination field.

In every technical high school the fields of examination will have to include Hungarian language and literature, mathematics and history. The remaining subjects, however, will be elective, depending on the nature of the respective schools and on the fields of specialization.

In case students continue their education at the college or university level, the results of their final high school examinations will not count towards consideration in the entrance examination. Each student will receive a maximum of 60 quality points on the basis of the grades he has earned in his high school fields at the end of the third and fourth year. (In the case of chemistry and geography, the grades at the end of the first and second year will be taken into account, unless the students have also taken these subjects as electives during their third and fourth years.) They will have the chance to secure another sixty points on the basis of a written and oral entrance examination that is generally taken in two subjects. Should the young graduates be applicants to an institution of higher learning which continues the specialization of their high schools, then they can select the oral and written examinations theoretical subjects that are in line with their high school's specialization. Those graduates of technical

high schools, however, who do not wish to continue their lines of specialization will have to take entrance examinations identical to those taken by the graduates of classical high schools.

Next year the use of the combined final high school exams and college and university entrance examination will be expanded. Previously only the technical high schools and the specialized colleges had such common examinations. Hereafter, these proven joint exams will also be organized jointly with the universities.

Special honors will only be counted in conjunction with the entrance examinations of the regular day students, and even there only during the year of their graduation from high school, and the year immediately thereafter. In the course of the next 2 years, the point system that is most beneficial to the applicant will be followed. After 4 years, however, only the results of the entrance examination will be considered.

The timely publication of these changes will make it possible for the effected educational experts, as well as for the parents and the students to prepare themselves by studying the essence of these modifications.

We are justifying the new system of final high school exams and college entrance examinations by means of the information that was supplied to us by the school administrators. According to this, under the old system, high school students would only study their examination fields, while at the same time they would fall behind in general culture. Moreover, the old grading system that stretched from one to twenty points made it extremely difficult for the examination committee to carry out its work. The new system based on 120 points will naturally stretch the spectrum, and it will produce a more varied picture. Also, fewer applicants will be able to reach the maximum number of points in six separate fields than in the two fields used earlier.

The members of the admission committee will continue to base their assessment on knowledge, ability, aptitude and general attitude, even though all currently known methods are primarily only suitable to measure scholarship. Specialists are still searching for a way to measure ability, aptitude and attitude. They expect the new system of admission to have a positive impact on high school studies. They hope that it will contribute to raising the general academic background of the young people, while also encouraging technical students to continue their studies.

The Cultural Ministry's new prospectus concerning admission to college and university admission, modification of the final high school graduating examinations, examination fields in various technical high schools, specialized institutions of higher learning, and the entrance examination subjects in the latter institutions will be mailed this month to all secondary schools and upper-level institutions.

9271
CSO: 2500

ELECTION SYSTEM IN RELEGATING AUTHORITY IN PARTY DISCUSSED

Warsaw ZYCIE PARTII in Polish No 3, 1981, pp 5-7

[Article by Prof Dr hab Edward Erasmus, head of the Department of Party and the Socialist State Theory of the Higher School of Social Sciences (WSNS): The "Electoral System as a Mechanism for Turning Over Authority in the Party," passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] A statement to the effect that the election system in the party is an integral part of intraparty democracy may seem trivial. What it essentially says is that the functioning system should not constrain, minimize or hamper intraparty democracy, but facilitate turning over authority, change in executive cadres, turning a minority into a majority. In theory, the problem has been solved by the introduction of democratic mechanisms. In practice, the idea of democratism has been implemented rather slowly.

Having in mind the importance of party unity, we must consider measures to insure that differences of opinions in the party, in the party authorities, could polarize, turning into collective wisdom without weakening the system of socialist democracy. /What is to be done to make the differences reinforce the system and have political changes occur under normal conditions where they cannot be used by the forces alien to socialism?/ An answer is indispensable to the question of how to prevent a situation in which changes in the leadership and strategic decisions are caused by social pressure of the working class and different social strata.

This problem swells as the spheres of the party's political actions widen, especially when its decisions concerning general political goals are at cross purposes with goals and postulates at the regional or local level or in the case of a collision between sound and scientifically grounded proposals and conclusions drawn from the observation of a narrow group of phenomena or a one-sided approach to complex political problems.

To Regulate or To Rectify

I do not treat this question as an inspiration for theoretical reflections, but rather as a point of departure in defining "guarantees." To begin with, the term "guarantees" should be narrowed down by at least stating whether the guarantees should regulate party affairs in their entirety or only rectify the already existing structures and mechanisms. It should be mentioned that in practice there are no full guarantees.

Risk is always involved in politics. By the same token, no procedure of changing the leadership guarantees mistake-free decisions. The heart of the matter is having credible mechanisms. The one we have had until now was not credible, despite different conditions.

In times of stabilization, arguments and even clashes in the central leadership of the party are hidden behind declarations of unity. Also, decisions of a compromise type are presented to the aktiv and society as the will of the entire leadership. This course of actions does not solve social contradictions nor does it defuse conflicts. Social conflicts surface most often in the organizational structures, in the modes and methods of activity of social groups. Under certain circumstances, political institutions, including the party, yield to the influence of group interests or to the influence of those alien to the party. This generates internal tension, which bring about crises in the ideological and political sphere.

In the ideological sphere, [the tensions] assume the shape of various concepts and are also manifested in the desire to secure influence on the authority, on the direction of the party's actions or to participate in the party's authorities. In other words, the most significant conflicts come to the fore within the party and the state apparatus. In the political sphere, conflicts also focus on the mode of articulating interests and the pace of their implementation. This is why the methods of conflict settling are not immaterial.

If the subject of argument is not disclosed, it is willy-nilly located at the top levels of party authority. Information finds its way out in the shape of concise releases/ Conversely, the differences of opinion and the mood of society pointed up in the press and popular scientific magazines are not reflected in the thinking and activity of the central party and state authorities. Make-believe unity shapes the opinion of the party.

This state of affairs causes the party membership and aktiv to be unaware of the scope of differences in political tasks and goals. They are even more unaware, because some aspects of the problem disclosed under discussion concern fragmentary issues. Most often they center on politics, personnel or economic issues or on political tensions of secondary importance. At the same time, /the essence of the debate is in the ideological and social problems linked with the construction of socialism, as all the events have proven./ Those are usually broader issues, concerning not only intraparty and political democracy but violations of the people's power principles, democratic centralism, legality, etc., as well.

Rectifying the political line has always been coupled with personnel changes, whereby the new leadership bodies came out as adherents of the consistent line of changes and reforms. It has also been coupled with social expectations that the party as the only force capable of solving the looming problems would set the direction of further progress. In a complex situation, liberal-bourgeois, revisionist and sectarian-dogmatic elements would be revitalized or would intensify their activity. Their ideas would trickle into various social and political strata, including the PZPR, SD [Democratic Party] and ZSL [United Peasant Party]. Time and time again, individual or group rivalries would surface in that kind of situation. At the same time, the party has neither background material nor information on the sources and subject of debates, discussions and controversies, for instance, in the Politbureau, voivodship

committees or between the central and local authorities. As a rule, /the party is surprised by personnel or leadership changes. Only at this time are the real causes of crisis disclosed. The costs of functioning in this mode are high. The party, by not having information and not participating in the discussion, becomes incapable of political struggle./ Self-regulating mechanisms are indispensable in this sphere as well.

The lack of a natural mechanism for the change of personnel in the power structure facilitates the stabilization of executive cadres. This, in its turn, reinforces the tendency toward the petrification of the leadership. As a result, the executive cadres get routinized. On the one hand, the awareness of the opportunity to subject all the manifestations of social life is formed, while on the other hand, the conviction is formed of the feasibility of retaining authority by a tight group of people. Should this situation last for a longer while, the places of those who measure up to the tasks at hand are taken by persons with subservient attitudes. They are only a pillar of the leadership group, but they are not of assistance to it.

Stabilization is indispensable. It should be borne in mind, though, that with management becoming the primary goal, executive functions strengthen the aspiration to secure a privileged social standing, to occupy a loftier position in the hierarchy of power.

The above remarks have served as a prerequisite for me to set forth a statement saying that the party does not yet have self-regulating mechanisms enabling changes in the leadership to occur under normal conditions.

Principle of Rotation

In the considerations of guarantees, rotation of positions, limitations on authority's tenure, decrease of responsibilities, etc., are mentioned as the "safety valves" and "self-regulators" of intraparty life. These regulators should not be neglected. As far as the rotation of cadres in both the party and state [administration] elective organs is concerned, different approaches to this matter are coming into view.

The opinion saying that persons who have held office for one or two terms should not be elected again is right. It is, however, an expression of the extreme opposition to the repeated election of the same person to a given representative body. A somewhat more moderate approach allows for exceptions to that principle, stating that a repeated election should be justified; the candidate should have traits guaranteeing the implementation of social interest. Hidden behind this approach is the conviction that not all elected officials are capable of continuously preserving independence of judgment and independence in their relationships with various authority arrangements, including informal arrangements. Both approaches are characterized by concern with not perpetuating the present arrangements and avoiding in this way their subordination by the general bureaucratic system.

In opposition to this approach, another approach, defined as "functional" is offered. According to it, merits of rotation are not negated, due, in part, to its close association with democracy. It is asserted, nonetheless, that under socialism, when planning extends the horizon of the country's development, conditions for larger stabilization in executive positions are created, on the one hand, while, on the other, the need grows in "... a rotation more moderate in time and adjusted to these needs." In this school of thought, it is considered that frequent rotation of

persons responsible for the implementation of long-term policies of the party and state is a complicating factor in the consistent and competent implementation of the plan. Moreover, it is reckoned that such rotation could lead to a predisposition not only to a subjective approach in personal policy, but to extemporaneity in the implementation of the program as well.

A different approach has appeared in the Union of Communists of Yugoslavia, where decentralization of responsibilities and rotation are built into the system. It seems that a decrease of responsibilities or rotation itself cannot solve this problem. There is more complexity to the issue than meets the eye.

The system of guarantees should transcend the formal framework. The present party structure is dominated by the cult of unanimity and rigorous discipline. Arguments in the leadership go on, a leadership within a leadership arises. The subject of controversy is hidden from the rest of the party. The scope of discord is not known to it. As a result, the party is deprived of the instruments with which it can be determined who is in the right. This does not allow the party membership to have an opinion of how the directions of party policy are molded, of what premises are taken into consideration. Under such premises, the mechanism of the exchange of views does not function properly, and, consequently, neither does the party.

Rotation of the cadres in the party apparatus is not a new issue either. The theory of the cadres policy has been enriched in the periods of growth in the democratic tendency (in the years 1956, 1970, 1980). In the search for ways of renovation, a different perspective has been and still is sought for adoption, namely, one that does not exclusively associate the term "party" with the party apparatus, despite its being an indispensable element of the system of leadership. The essence here comes down to the transformation of the apparatus into an ancillary organ of the party. Indispensable for this are two premises. /The apparatus will be instrumental to the party to the degree that it is subjected to social control. It will function creatively and in the name of socialist goals to the degree criteria of selection and change of personnel are defined and the indispensable mechanisms for this change provided, whereby work and the duty of rotation cannot deprive the personnel of their professional qualifications.

/Far-reaching proposals can be found in literature on the subject. For example, the students of the Central Party School, with their party apparatus background, proposed in 1956 to: "elect the apparatus personnel from among specialists in different fields for terms not longer than 3 to 5 years, subjected to an ongoing system of periodic reviews by respective competent commissions at every level of the party hierarchy. Obligatory rotation would deprive them of the opportunity to identify themselves with the authority and make them improve their professional qualification, thus enabling them in due time to return to their respective occupations." Such a rotation has an advantage in that it does not predispose one to identify with the authority and at the same time provides a stimulus for maintaining contacts with the parent enterprise./

Rotation is not, however, the only and the most important safety valve for intraparty democracy. Its efficacy hinges on the positive answer to the question: Who should take the main initiative in this area and make the final decision? If only the highest level takes the initiative, a distortion of the idea of rotation can be reflected in "the cadre merry-go-round," which means the transfer of a person subject

to rotation to an equal or higher position in the element of state authority. This is not meant to say that transfers to other jobs should be equated with professional deranking. At the same time, promotion should not be the rule, but a result of, for example, competitive staffing.

Today we need to reflect on still other guarantees. /Guarantees safeguarding fundamental Marxist principles, aimed against a life-style estimated in terms of accumulated wealth and against speedy promotions in the power structure at the expense of political aspirations of the party membership appear indispensable. There is a need for guarantees guarding the party against the loss of its primary function, that is, spearheading the march of the working class and all progressive and revolutionary forces./ The mechanisms which would permanently give a warning of the vanguard falling behind the spontaneous expectations of the toilers and also of the danger of the growth of anti-socialist forces should be built into the political system.

To recapitulate, /the guarantees can be efficient when there are no loopholes for various exceptions, when the content of resolutions cannot be arbitrarily interpreted, when a democratic election system is in operation./

Democratism and Centralism

Two trends, democratic and centralist, have emerged in the workers movement. Correspondingly, they were coupled with different procedures and electoral laws. In the Marxist-Leninist theoretical tradition, democratic procedures dominated. This has been expressed in the following actions: Open nomination of candidates ahead of time at pre-elections meetings; comprehensive justification of nominated candidates; consultations concerning proposals with members and representatives of the working class; presentation to the electorate of detailed programs of actions, especially of those concerned with the methods of implementation of the general party program. Central to the democratic trend has been a concern with creating and perfecting the mechanisms for the handing over of power and with the candidates enjoying the trust of the electorate, being nominated and elected by the electorate. Indispensable to this procedure is the adoption of the principle of resigning discharged party and state posts at a certain age (for example, 65). When drastic shocks due to the concentration of authority (for example, in the hands of the first secretary) and voluntaristic decisions made by one person or under the influence of one person are desired to be avoided /the principle of rotation/ (limitation of one person's tenure in one position) and /the cadence principle/ (limitation of the tenure in power of elected party, state, trade union and youth movement authorities) should be in effect.

/It should be mentioned that the cadence principle was introduced in 1961 by the 22nd CPSU Congress, but was rescinded later on the grounds of its hampering the proper exercise of passive and active electoral rights and leading to "(...) the excessive turnover of personnel, because capable officials of the echelons had to resign for technical reasons." While canceling the regulation of the 22nd CPSU Congress, the recommendation was retained to adhere to "(...) the principle of consistently renewing the membership of party organs and continuity of leadership./

/In the Leninist tradition, primary importance was attached to the elective character of the centers of leadership authority and the right to recall elected party officials, with suffrage being elevated to the rank of a statutory norm./ The electorate enjoyed

the right to analyze and discuss the problems of the party, recall authorities, control the activities of echelons and definite party functionaries; the outgoing authorities had an obligation to submit reports on their activities in their entirety.

Procedures for nominating candidates are also different. In the centralist model, the mode of nomination is one-way--mainly from top to bottom--and excessively institutionalized. In the democratic trend, candidates are nominated by members of the party organization or by party conferences. In the centralist model, the outgoing authorities take over this privilege, the pretext being that the democratic mode of nominating candidates brings on the danger of infusion into the authorities of people inclined to dissolve in the party. These individuals supposedly have little discipline, are predisposed to demagoguery or have shaky political persuasions. This is deemed to have a potential to violate the principle of party continuity and ideological unity.

To sum up, the democratic mechanism of the electoral system expresses itself in overcoming limitations and groundless apprehensions that intraparty democracy is threatened by the election of authorities from among multiple candidates, recalling and removing from party posts people who do not enjoy the trust of party organizations as well as [the apprehension] that the authority of the party can be undermined by the obligation to submit reports at dates explicitly specified and by the adherence to the principles of cadence and rotation of party authorities. The democratic mechanism of nominating candidates to the party echelons, including the right to criticize and voice opposition to persons who do not enjoy authority in the parent party organization ties in with this trend. Essentially, what is meant here is that candidates for party authorities should present their intentions regarding the implementation of the party program and the program adopted by a specific party organization.

In the centralist trend, the essence of the principle of electing authorities and persons assumes the form of a one-way nominational act. The act of election is technical in character. Executive bodies rank high, whereas the lawmaking organs, the party legislature, rank low. The executive body offers recommendations, the candidate accepts the nomination to participate in the authorities and the electorate endorses the pact made about it. While in the democratic procedure candidates are nominated by a party meeting, in the centralist model executive elements take over this privilege. This is always done in the name of preserving continuity, as if the delegates assembled at a party conference desired something different.

/The principle of cooptation/ is linked with the centralist model. Of course, the habit of coopting members of the echelons can be considered as a necessity ensuing from the party's situation and not as the realization of democratic centralism. The use of this procedure was at one time a consequence of working in the underground. However, even in the early days of creation of the new type of party, it was postulated that persons coopted to the leading party echelons would participate in the authority until circumstances changed and allowed election of persons in the way of a balloting act, in accordance with the party statute. Characteristically, in the CPSU cooptation was abandoned as a method of recruiting into the leading bodies immediately after the end of the civil war and elective recruiting was introduced. Later on, the principle of cooptation was reinstated.

It seems that the principles of electricity and joint decisionmaking and especially that of personal responsibility are at variance also with the principle of accumulating elective functions and, even more so, of accumulating functions by

nomination. This happens when members of the apparatus are burdened with elective functions. In this situation, functionaries have two roles. On the one hand, they take part in decisionmaking, on the other, they have an obligation to execute the decisions. There is also a political aspect to it: When officials of the apparatus discharge elective responsibilities they simultaneously occupy the place of the workers representation.

In this context, one more issue presents itself. The issue may come down to the question of the degree to which the party is dominated by professional politicians, if the bulk of officials have a long or a very long tenure in party work, this cannot but influence the work of the entire party as well as the functioning of the electoral system. One more important point: To that degree does the party apparatus reflect the professional and educational structure of our society? Regardless of the answer to these questions, one thing is certain: /Professionalization of political work has both positive and negative aspects./ The negative aspects express themselves in the alienation of party cadres from the social background, from the party itself and in their decrease in sensitivity to social needs, not to mention the danger of striking out of various organizational structures. The positive aspects are the chance of gaining more latitude in maneuvering and the chance of obtaining increased ability to compromise.

97C1

CSO: 2600/183

CIVIL DEFENSE ACHIEVEMENTS, PLANS OUTLINED

Annual Briefing of Key Personnel

Warsaw PRZEGLAD OBRONY CYWILNEJ in Polish No 1, Feb 81 pp 8-10

[Article by Grazyna Dembowska: "National Briefing of Civil Defense Command Personnel"]

[Text] The subject of the annual briefing of the military Civil Defense Command personnel that was recently completed in Warsaw, was the fulfillment of civil defense tasks in the past five-year period and the basic tasks for the present year. The participants included the chief of OCK [Obrona Cywilna Kraju--National Civil Defense], Lt Gen Tadeusz Tuczapski, deputy minister of national defense. The briefing was conducted by the chief of the OCK Inspectorate, OCK deputy chief, Brig Gen Jozef Cwetsch. Ministry representatives and chiefs of provincial inspectorates of civil defense reported on the fulfillment of measures planned for the past period as well as on the problems that arose and their causes.

The 1975-1980 five-year plan period was a period of particularly complex operations for civil defense. In view of the reform of local control and management elements and the introduction in 1975 of a new administrative subdivision of the country, priority had to be given to adapt the tasks and organizational structure of civil defense to these changes and to closely correlate its premises with the needs for economic development of the nation.

The principal objective of the 5-year work to improve civil defense was to implement the resolutions of the Committee for National Defense pertaining to standardization, organizational-technical, and training problems, so as to assure a comprehensive gearing of all civil defense forces and resources to the fulfillment of tasks within a uniform state defense system. This aim has been accomplished, as General Tuczapski, chief of OCK, declared at the briefing. Major progress has been noted in particular as regards the preparations for protecting the civilian population, the national economy, and cultural property, as well as the functioning of organizational-technical systems. The coordination of civil defense measures with national and territorial development plans has also produced good results. Care has been taken to maintain a high organizational-functional efficiency of all OC organs and forces, as well as a high level of readiness to take steps in the event of natural disasters, catastrophes, and breakdowns.

Much attention has been devoted to the problem of dispersal, which for Poland is a basic means of protecting the population in the event of a threat. Various dispersal variants were considered. Certain exercises have been carried out, confirming the validity of the adopted concept.

A major place among the accomplishments of the past 5-year period is occupied by the amendment in 1979 of the Law Concerning Universal Duty for the Defense of the Polish People's Republic (PRL). This law regulates the functioning of civil defense in the state's national defense system.

The improvements in civil defense in recent years have been accompanied by universally known adverse events in the state's economic and social life. These events were, of course, also bound to affect adversely this field of defense preparations as well. (This makes all the more valuable all that has been accomplished despite the adverse situation and varied difficulties.) These events have chiefly affected the fulfillment of defense construction projects and the progress of the work to protect livestock, crops, foodstuffs, and water against contamination.

In assessing the achievements so far, the OCK chief stressed that they result from the consistent implementation of the tasks specified in the Law Concerning the Universal Duty for the Defense of the PRL. Such actions have made it now possible to undertake activities of a different quality, activities intended to "fully substantiate and introduce into practice conceptual guidelines which should be reflected in specific legislative provisions governing the organization and functioning of OC as well as in the attainment of the required level of readiness to undertake coordinated emergency-rescue and protective measures."

Every period (whether medium-range or annual) of implementation of the long-range program for the development of civil defense requires systematic and intense work in all of its sectors. Nevertheless--depending on needs and actual possibilities--priorities have to be determined and efforts have to be concentrated in specific directions of action that happen to be most crucial in a given period.

The objectives for the next few years, as discussed at the briefing, indicate that in 1981 attention will be chiefly focused on introducing regulations to implement the law amended 2 years ago; drafting maximally realistic plans that take into account the actual needs and investment production and the personnel potential of discrete organizational units; maintaining shelter structures in proper condition and equipping them for use as depots and training facilities or for utilization by the national economy; and unconditionally observing the principles of a thrifty and rational management of equipment. Attention should also be centered on implementing all measures in accordance with the currently ongoing reform of the economic system at all levels of control and management. And, of course, attention should also be paid to training, because it, and especially practical training--as strongly emphasized by the chief of the OCK Inspectorate, General Cwetsch--is an integral part of civil defense preparations in every element of state administration and the national economy, as well as in public organizations, schools, and the work posts and sites of residence of the population. It is intended to prepare people for tasks that may have to be carried out in various peacetime, war-threatening, and wartime situations. Of course, the training system must be modified in accordance with the changes taking place in civil defense in connection with the amendments to the law.

The participants in the briefing discussed also with great interest the draft of the new civil defense decree of the Council of Ministers.

The national training briefing of the military command personnel of OC ended with the honoring of the provincial civil defense inspectorates--Krakow, Poznan, Koszalin, Nowy Sacz--that scored the best achievements. The chiefs of these inspectorates were handed relay trophies by General Tuczapski.

Comments by Civil Defense Chief

Warsaw PRZEGLAD OBRONY CYWILNEJ in Polish No 2, Feb 81 pp 1-5

[Article by Lt Gen Tadeusz Tuczapski, deputy minister of national defense: "Civil Defense in the Service of the Defensibility and Security of the Polish Peoples' Republic"--passages within slantlines printed in boldface all-caps]

[Text] Every successive medium-range or annual training period in the civil defense system is a significant step forward in implementing the long-range program for the development and improvement of all elements and components of that system within the overall organizational-functional structure of the state. For each year there exist specific goals and tasks, and each year has its own characteristic emphasis ensuing from doctrinal instructions and political-defense guidelines. Each year contributes a new meaning and new values to the overall picture of defensibility. This year, training within the nation's civil defense system coincides with the 30th anniversary celebration of its functioning in the Polish People's Republic [PRL] as well as with the commencement of the next 5-year training period. It thus appears logical to examine the future training and developmental objectives of Civil Defense [OC] against the background of the broader panorama of its experience and achievements so far.

The structure and functions of civil defense in the service of the defensibility and security of the fatherland have been evolving through successive stages of the development and elaboration of a unified state defense system as an important component part of that system. Thus the achievements made so far predetermine the nature, importance, and scope of chronologically solved problems of civil defense and serve to better understand its premises, purposes, tasks, and prospects as viewed from the standpoint of the changing scale and nature of the threat presented by the imperialist and cold-war forces.

When the effort was first made 30 years ago to establish an optimally efficient system for the protection of the Polish population and broad assurance of the nation's economic-technical infrastructure, it was, and remains, a highly complex effort. The nature of the organizational and material difficulties ensued especially from the unprecedented nature of the threat. The introduction of nuclear-missile weaponry caused a revolution in the entire philosophy and reality of war, and in all military and sociopolitical preconditions and consequences of war. A qualitatively new strategy has been included within the scope of defense doctrines and concepts. Broadly speaking, this meant corresponding changes in the science and art of preparations for the defense of the interior and the protection of the population, cultural property, and the entire production-economic and technological substance of the state. The unprecedented scope and consequences of the eventual nuclear conflict had thus to be considered not only in military planning but also in specific defense and protection measures in every nonmilitary domain and aspect of defensibility.

Our experiences and convictions regarding an up-to-date treatment of the role, place, and importance of civil defense in the state's defense system were reflected in the 1973 decree of the Council of Ministers, which specifies the appropriate tasks for the organs of state administration, units of the socialized economy, and the general citizenry! Although the decree did not and could not cover many essential problems which had first to be investigated and verified in research and training practice, it did create a solid unifying, organizational-tasking, and theoretical basis which made possible the initiation of concrete actions throughout the state's social and administrative structure. The implementation of the decree's provisions coincided in time with the reform, conducted during 1973-1975, of local management and administration agencies and the new administrative subdivision of the country. It was thus necessary to closely coordinate civil defense measures with all the defense tasks being carried out within the structure of the entire state, that is, in the sphere of political, economic, and defense objectives, in the assurance of domestic order and security, and in the command system of the armed forces. In accordance with these guidelines, the principal direction of the development and improvement of civil defense during 1976-1980 was toward /THE DEVELOPMENT AND INTRODUCTION OF STANDARD-SETTING, ORGANIZATIONAL, TECHNICAL, AND TRAINING DECISIONS OF THE COMMITTEE FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE ASSURING A COORDINATED PREPARATION OF ALL OC FORCES AND RESOURCES FOR UNDERTAKING FUNCTIONAL TASKS WITHIN THE STATE'S UNIFIED DEFENSE SYSTEM./

The experience of the 5-year period of development and improvement of the nation's civil defense system indicates that this aim has been achieved. Individual ministries and local agencies of state administration as well as their component provincial civil defense inspectorates have undertaken specific projects to prepare particularized organizational-technical systems! On the basis of the aforesaid decree, civil defense formations have been appointed at the central level as well as at province, city, village, township, and manufacturing plant levels. Measures have been initiated to equip and retrain these formations in accordance with the anticipated tasks and specific local-organizational nature. Detailed tasks and organizational structure of OC have been adapted to the changes ensuing from the reform of the local state administration and the new territorial subdivision of the country. Planning and organizing work has been developed at every level, starting with townships and manufacturing plants and ending with the central levels. The concept of the long-range plan for the development and principal directions of the preparations for national civil defense has been worked out. Major advances have been made in improving protection of the population, the national economy, and cultural property, especially as regards the functioning of organizational-technical systems. Satisfactory results have also been achieved as regards coordinating the needs of civil defense with the premises for national and territorial development. Attention has been drawn to the need to maintain a high organizational and technical-functional efficiency of all OC agencies and forces as well as their readiness for immediate action in the event of natural disasters, catastrophes, and emergencies menacing man and his environment.

The fulfillment of these tasks has been fruitfully assisted by the system for training the managerial personnel of state administration, the agencies for economic management, and the permanent OC staff, organized by the Committee for National Defense, and the central political, administrative, and economic agencies, and also by the chief of the OCK. The experience gained in OC training, exercises, and study-problem games points to major contributions to the understanding and substantiation of the premises of the nations' defense doctrine, and to the application of these premises to practical activity within the OC system at every control and management.

The conclusions drawn from conceptual-organizational and developmental activities and from the civil defense training process have been fully and broadly applied to the amended (in 1979) Law Concerning the Universal Duty for the Defense of the PRL. This law, which took into account and systematized the achievements of Polish thought on the theory of defense, has provided the legal framework for the functioning of civil defense within the state's unified defense system. Its standard-setting provisions pertain in particular to the basic problems and objectives relating to preparing the protection of the population, material resources, and cultural property of the nation, as well as to measures to be taken in war-threatening situations and measures connected with surmounting the effects of natural disasters and dangers ensuing from uncontrolled industrial processes.

But along with the indisputable achievements and progress in preparing the nation's civil defense system it also became evident that there were soft spots in that system--spots whose nature, causes, and scope correspond to the adverse events that have in recent years been taking place in various sectors of the national economy and in the nation's social life. In particular, the drafting of various regulations implementing the decree has been progressing too slowly and a marked lag has been observed in the fulfillment of civil defense construction projects. The work to assure optimal conditions for the protection of animals, crops, foodstuffs, and water against contamination and contagion has been inadequate to the need.

On the whole, however, the results achieved and the consistent implementation of the tasks ensuing from the Law Concerning Universal Duty for the Defense of the PRL have assured a favorable starting point for undertaking qualitatively new work within the civil defense system during the 1981-1985 period. Of course, it must be considered that that work will be carried out in a complicated international and domestic political-strategic and economic situation. Major complications may be caused by the further escalation of the policy of confrontation and infringement by the leaders of the NATO political-military bloc of the existing global military balance to the disadvantage of the Soviet Union and the socialist countries. Such activities at present provide the greatest threat to international detente and the maintenance of universal security. Special anxiety, moreover, is caused by the fact that, as in the immediate postwar period, the United States again is resorting to cold-war policies and nuclear blackmail. So-called Presidential Directive No 59, signed last year, introduces into world policy new and unusually menacing objectives of nuclear strategy which provide that, in the event of conflict, American missiles will be directed against the main state and military centers of the Soviet Union, against the staging areas of its armed forces, and against its command centers and missile centers. This antidetente aggressive concept has even further lowered the threshold of the nuclear threat and markedly intensified the danger of worldwide nuclear conflict. It is obvious that the new strategy of the United States, as combined with the concept of the deployment of Eurostrategic weapons, does not favor the relaxation of international tension but, rather, threatens the escalation of the arms race to a still higher ceiling.

The accelerated development of modern weapons, the increasing variety of their types, their great destructive force and unlimited range, the precision with which they are targeted, and, above all, the tremendous increase in the importance of the development of rear areas, confront present-day civil defense with an unprecedentedly difficult task for a comprehensive assurance of the interior defense front. This task must be carried out in close coordination with other national defense objectives, with the solution of the currently most vital problems of a renewal of social and economic life in every component and element of the structure of our state.

It should be considered that the introduction of that reform will modify certain relations between central and local agencies, especially as regards enterprises and labor establishments. As a result, the guidelines for the Five-Year Plan for the Development of Civil Defense, which mesh with the guidelines for the National Socioeconomic Plan, will correspondingly have to be flexibly adapted to the new reality and new conditions of functioning within the territorial [decentralized] system.

The rate at which modern civil defense encounters new problems and spreads into new domains of activity greatly exceeds the possibilities for their immediate treatment within the training system and in the implementing regulations. This makes it all the more important to emphasize the role of defense-theory exercises which, during the first stage of the long-term training process, should introduce the trainees to the process of an orderly and multifaceted understanding of the concepts, basic information fund, and functioning principles of civil defense.

In particular it is desirable that all centers for advanced training of administrative personnel extend civil defense training to persons newly appointed to specified functional posts, in order to familiarize them with the basic problems of OC, so that the managers and employees of the administrative apparatus would be constantly conscious of the principle of the creative correlation of actual service problems with the tasks of civil defense.

/DURING THE SECOND STAGE/ the chief attention in developing and improving civil defense should be focused on coordinating its basic elements, structures, and organizational-technical subsystems within the framework of the state's unified defense system, as well as on raising the level of readiness for immediate implementation of complex OC tasks and on continuing research and conceptual and developmental work.

To carry out this crucial and broadly formulated task, the Guidelines of the Chief of National Civil Defense should be--on the basis of the conducted tactical-technical studies and analyses as well as of the results of practical exercises--appropriately particularized and adapted to the needs and conditions of discrete local organizations and labor establishments. Special care should be shown in verifying and updating the existing plans and objectives concerning collective protection of the population and of labor establishments and public utilities, the preparation and equipping of civil defense formations, and the establishment of a national warning and alert system as well as a contamination-detecting system.

It is vital to further intensify the work intended to elaborate the civil defense provisions contained in the Law Concerning Universal Duty for the Defense of the PRL, to perform thorough studies of the role, place, and tasks of civil defense in the state's unified defense system, and to undertake efforts to tighten the structure of OC forces and resources, functioning principles, and principles of cooperation with other defense elements, primarily from the standpoint of practical possibilities for the routine organizational-defense and training functions of OC. The work that is of special importance includes the continual updating of the evaluation of the degree of susceptibility of and threat to the major facilities, regions, and urban industrial centers from the standpoint of the consequences of possible technological breakdowns, floods, fires, toxic pollutants, possibilities for population dispersal, and the elimination of the consequences of eventual armed action by the enemy.

The Guidelines of the Civil Defense chief for the 1981-1985 Period envisage that /THE FUNDAMENTAL PURPOSE OF THE DEVELOPMENT AND IMPROVEMENT OF CIVIL DEFENSE SHOULD BE THE COMPLETE SUBSTANTIATION AND PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF CONCEPTUAL PREMISES WHICH SHOULD BE REFLECTED IN PARTICULARIZED LEGISLATIVE REGULATIONS CONCERNING THE ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONING OF OC AND THE ATTAINMENT OF THE REQUIRED READINESS TO UNDERTAKE COORDINATED EMERGENCY-RESCUE AND PROTECTIVE ACTIONS WITHIN THE STATE'S UNIFIED DEFENSE SYSTEM./

The achievement of this goal will require the solution of certain fundamental problems relating to two successive interrelated and intermeshed states of OC training, development, and improvement.

/DURING THE FIRST STAGE/ attention should be chiefly focused on adaptation planning and organizational-operative and technical activities to the adopted premises as well as on drafting and introducing regulations implementing the amended Law Concerning Universal Duty for the Defense of the PRL. This stage includes specific tasks whose accomplishment is crucial to the further evolution of civil defense as a complex system comprising various domains and aspects of modern defensibility of the state.

In translating general guidelines into particularized and properly specific tasks, programs, and plans of action to be implemented, it is necessary at present, now that we are at the threshold of a new year, to precede planning and training work by a thorough analysis of all conditions and events that have in the past retarded or even stopped progress in organizational and implementing activities. The planning based on such a process should provide for a precisely defined guiding idea as well as lists of tasks that take into account specific needs and possibilities, especially as regards finance, investments, production, and personnel. What matters most is that the entire planning and organizational-implementing activity should be reflected as fully as possible in tangible effects, in tangible quantitative and qualitative improvements in the facilities and systems serving the current needs of socioeconomic development and, at the same time, serving the needs of population protection. This also concerns actions intended to strengthen the infrastructure of utilities, communications, transportation, power systems, and ecological protection. Much astuteness should be displayed in dealing with the adaptation and deployment--in accordance with civil defense needs--of health-service facilities, housing construction, industrial construction, the development of the mass food-supply network, trade and services, education, science, culture, and recreation. It is necessary to popularize as strongly as possible the knowledge that the development of the socioeconomic infrastructure not only contributes to improved living standards of the population but also should favorably affect minimizing the susceptibility of discrete facilities to various breakdowns or of the dangerous consequences of the use of modern means of armed struggle, especially weapons of mass destruction.

All planning, organizational, and training objectives should be thoroughly pondered and coordinated in every important detail and parameter with the operational-defense planning system of the provincial military staffs as well as with the socioeconomic development plans of ministries, provinces, municipalities, townships, and manufacturing plants. The work in progress should, moreover, be completely in accord with the aims, mechanisms, and strategic assumptions of the reform of the economic system being introduced in this country at every level of control and management.

The experience gained in national-defense exercises conducted with the participation of central and local agencies of state administration as well as of the forces and resources of civil defense, points to the need to develop the concept of the functioning of OC organs at various levels in such a manner that they can continuously take part in every stage of the decisionmaking process as regards the facilities and domains of the nation's life that are potentially threatened. This is an immeasurably important problem, involving such an organization of labor and improvements in the system of defense readiness, training, and shaping of information and decisionmaking processes, that every employee, every manager, and every political and social leader, as well as every organizational element regardless of its place in the hierarchy of management and administration, would know what to do, what decisions to make, what forces and resources to activate, and how to begin in the event of threatening situations, breakdowns, and national disasters of varying scope and technical complexity. The important thing is that, in peacetime and in the course of the daily exercise of one's duties whatever they are, it is necessary to improve skills and prepare the necessary material and technical resources for coping with the much more difficult and complex situations and requirements of wartime exigencies.

Last year the general tasks stated in the Guidelines of the Chief of National Civil Defense will be particularized and adapted to the plans for economic development and the advances in the work on the economic reform. They will also be correspondingly adapted to the changes in the system of management within the local administration and labor establishments. Presumably, the adopted planning procedure will contribute to a more effective solution of the basic problems of civil defense in all of its domains and organizational elements.

The thoroughness with which all basic aspects of civil defense preparations are explored, defined, and considered in programs of action and in the training process, as well as the attention devoted to the problems and tasks of civil defense in planning and organizational work, will affect the defense strength and efficiency of every element in the structure of our state as well as the completeness and universality of the readiness for coordinated, effective action in various threatening situations!

We are beginning the new training period in the conviction that the goals outlined shall be implemented in accordance with the premises, and that we shall enrich with new elements and cognitive values our knowledge and practical action skills as regards civil defense. This aim should be assisted by the conceptual, research, and training work being undertaken by the discrete party-political echelons, the administrative apparatus, the local military staffs, and the civil defense inspectorates and all civil defense elements within the structure of the ministries, provinces, cities, townships, and labor establishments.

Interview with OC Inspectorate Chief

Warsaw CZATA in Polish No 4, 22 Feb 81 pp 9,11

[Interview with Col Włodzimierz Chrobot, deputy chief of the National Civil Defense Inspectorate, by Edward Frankowski: "It Aids and Rescues"]

[Text] Civil Defense [OC] is the subject of much attention in the mass media, particularly in the local press, labor establishments, schools, institutions, and cities and villages. This is

understandable, since its purpose is to protect the population, the production plants, public utilities, and cultural property, and to provide rescue and help for victims, as well as to cooperate in combating natural disasters and eliminating their consequences. On the occasion of the [30th] Jubilee Anniversary of OC, this reporter interviewed the deputy chief of the National Civil Defense [OCK] Inspectorate, Col Włodzimierz Chrobot.

[Question] Thirty years ago, on 26 February 1951, the Diet of the PRL [Polish People's Republic] voted into life the TOPL [Terenowa Obrona Przeciwlotnicza--Territorial Air Defense], the predecessor of civil defense. What were its beginnings?

[Answer] In 1951 we began from scratch! We had nothing but good intentions. And although not all of the work has progressed at the same pace, its main direction has been valid. The burden of responsibility for the nation's defense, until then resting on the armed forces, has been distributed among the entire nation.

[Question] This happened because nowadays not even having an excellently equipped and trained army is enough. The times when fighting against the invader was the business of the armed forces alone are past, the more so considering that the enemy, with appropriate means at his disposal, may at any moment appear anywhere, in the border zone as well as in the country's remote interior.

[Answer] That is so. That is why everyone is preparing for defense. The Polish nation, which in the past has repeatedly given proof of tremendous sacrifices for the sake of the freedom and independence of the fatherland, has once again proved its worth. Systematic if slow--adapted to the organizational and economic possibilities--preparations for universal self-defense had begun. Our actions have been taking place in an atmosphere of concern from and assistance by party and state authorities as well as of fruitful cooperation with public organizations such as the League for National Defense, the Polish Red Cross, the Union of Volunteer Firemen, and others.

[Question] In the 1950's the National Defense League had trained territorial self-defense detachments, and thus blazed the path for the subsequently formed elements of OC. It was and is popularizing the ideas of OC.

[Answer] We are grateful to it. In November 1951, the league took over the training of the population for territorial air defense, and in 1953 it introduced the badge, "Ready for Air and Chemical Defense." At the same time, it developed mass training of the population in air and chemical defense, and in the 1960's it took over from us the task of defense training of the population with respect to OBMAR [Obrona Przeciw Bymł Masowego Razenia--Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction]. It has also introduced, in cooperation with the Polish Boy Scouts Union, the Youth Badge of Defense Efficiency.

[Question] It is worth recalling here that the league has also been developing defense sports and training-technical activities in behalf of the national economy and defensibility. Thus, in 1950-1953 rifle training was extended to 200,000 persons, and marksmanship practice to 70,000 persons. In addition, the league organized motorcycle- and car-driving courses for 35,000 amateurs belonging in "two and four circles." It has also trained more than 3,000 communications operators. Furthermore, it undertook sea and air training. During the same time, it conducted polytechnical courses for future army conscripts. As a result, our armed forces and national economy, including civil defense, were provided with thousands of skilled drivers, communications operators, frogmen, and other specialists.

[Answer] Their assistance has made itself felt in all our civil defense elements. The tremendous effort of the half-million army of the members of plant and territorial OC units, the proper management by the command staff, especially by the reserve officers, and the universal preparation of the population have made it possible for present-day civil defense to be an adequate complement to and worthy partner of our people's armed forces. This is due to the preparation of more than 21 million urban and rural residents for defense, the complete retraining and practical preparation of our units for rescue activities, and their provision with adequate equipment. This is also due to the construction and systematic modernization of a definite number of public shelters and the creation of an up-to-date national warning system and its maintenance in a state of complete readiness.

[Question] Consider another (and also very significant) aspect of civil defense activity, namely, the fact that civil defense formations not only are greatly committed to preparations for protecting the population against weapons of mass destruction but also were and are accomplishing many useful projects for labor establishments, cities and villages.

[Answer] This has already become the rule in coordination exercises at township and city levels, during which local roads are built, cable is laid, equipment is maintained and terrain is cleaned of rubble. There was never a shortage of members of OC units in rescue operations during natural disasters, catastrophes, and industrial breakdowns. The members of our formation through self-sacrificing work have rescued human lives, public property, and the personal property of citizens.

[Question] What are the main directions of action and tasks of OC?

[Answer] The most important tasks pertain to population protection, that is, contamination warnings, providing the populations with individual gear for protecting the respiratory tract, eyes, and skin, preparing shelters, organizing blackouts in cities, townships, villages, and industrial plants, organizing population dispersal and evacuating labor establishments. The next group of tasks includes the protection of foodstuffs, feeds, water, and livestock against radioactive, chemical and biological contamination. Yet another group of tasks pertains to protection of labor establishments, public utilities, raw materials and products, and cultural property, i.e., to actions intended to assure that continuity of production indispensable to the state and the nation. Next in order are tasks pertaining to rescue and emergency-repair operations in the event of both wartime operations and natural disasters, catastrophes, and industrial breakdowns. Here we are dealing with aid to the wounded, the rescue of people from burning and collapsed buildings, and the repair of the power, gas, and water networks.

[Question] It is known that OC formations participate on a mass scale in the struggle against elemental disasters such as fire and flood. For example, during the severe winter and subsequent spring floods in 1979, the worst in a century, 125,000 to 180,000 persons participated in these operations for several months. The outwardly undistinguished-looking "civilians" hastened to the rescue wherever the situation was at its worst. They protected levees, land-reclamation facilities, bridges, locks, industrial enterprises, farms, and livestock-breeding establishments. They helped to evacuate the population from flooded areas, as well as to evacuate finished

products and foodstuffs from warehouses and stores, and purebred livestock, too. This, of course, can be done by any "civilian." But who are the individuals appointed to execute the tasks of identifying and eliminating sources of contamination?

[Answer] In the plant OC units they are chiefly recruited from among the staff of the chemical, physicochemical, technological, and microbiological laboratories of their plants. In the territorial detachments, on the other hand, they are selected from employees of laundries, dyeing plants, public baths, sanitation enterprises and (in the countryside) machinery stations, state farms, agricultural cooperatives, gardening cooperatives, agrotechnical services, and teachers of chemistry, physics, and biology.

[Question] A Major role in OC undertakings is played by the OC Personnel Training Center, which also is celebrating its 30th anniversary.

[Answer] Of course, and in the 30 years of its existence it has retrained 25,000 persons. Its graduates now work in the provincial and municipal OC inspectorates and are among the command personnel of OC in the ministries and labor establishment. They also include lecturers on military courses in institutions of higher education, officer instructors in the Volunteer Labor Detachments, and others who pass on the knowledge gained at that center, sharing it with their subordinates as far down as at the level of rank-and-file members of urban and rural OC units.

The center's teaching faculty have joined conceptual and publicist work on the pages of the popular PRZEGŁAD OC [Civil Defense Review], which this year celebrates its 25th anniversary of existence. They also contribute to the publishing activities of the OCE Inspectorate. The center not only trains competent OC experts but also commanders capable of directing our formations in various situations.

Frankowski: Thank you for the interview.

BRIEFS

SWEDISH UNION AID: SOLIDARITY--Cooperation between the Swedish Trade Unions Confederation and the Polish labor union movement, Solidarity, is beginning to acquire more permanent forms. In May the Swedish Trade Unions Confederation (LO) is sending an entire office printing press to Gdansk. That is one of the results of the conversations which the LO has been conducting with Solidarity representatives, who are this week visiting Sweden. "We have good cooperation with Solidarity, free from political problems or union difficulties," said LO Secretary Rune Molin, one of the Swedish hosts. In December 1980, the Free Labor Union International (FFI) decided that LO should coordinate FFI aid for Solidarity. "Right now it is very advantageous that LO is coordinating FFI aid," said Andrzej Slowik, member of the Solidarity national council, at a press conference in Stockholm Wednesday. "LO is a large organization with experience, and by the aid going through Sweden we avoid political provocations." [Text] [Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 30 Apr 81 p 30]

CSO: 3109/168

AGREEMENTS WITH FOREIGN COUNTRIES RATIFIED, PUBLISHED

[Editorial Report] Bucharest BULETINUL OFICIAL in Romanian Part I No 19, 27 March 1981, pages 1-2 reports that the following international treaties to which Romania is a signatory have been ratified:

The agreement on the long-term program for economic and technical-scientific collaboration between Romanian and Yugoslavia, signed in Belgrade on 24 October 1980; the agreement between Romania and Cameroon on the mutual guaranteeing of investments, signed in Bucharest on 30 August 1980; the long-term economic and technical cooperation agreement between Romania and Zimbabwe, signed in Bucharest on 23 September 1980; the economic and technical cooperation agreement between Romania and Somalia, signed in Bucharest on 13 October 1980; the agreement for the mutual recognition of certificates of authorship and other titles for the protection of investments, signed in Havana on 18 December 1976; the convention between Romania and Cuba for juridical assistance in civil, family and penal matters, signed in Bucharest on 28 June 1980; the agreement between the Government of Romania and the Government of Denmark on the promotion and mutual guaranteeing of investments, signed in Copenhagen on 12 November 1980; the agreement between Romania and Hungary on long-term economic, technical and scientific collaboration and cooperation, signed in Bucharest on 21 October 1980; the trade and payments agreement between the Government of Romania and the Government of Lebanon, signed in Bucharest on 6 December 1980; the convention between Romania and Sudan on the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion for income and capital taxes, signed in Khartoum on 25 April 1979; the convention between Romania and Norway on the avoidance of double taxes on income and property, signed in Oslo on 14 November 1980.

The texts of these agreements are published in the same issue of BULETINUL OFICIAL, pages 2-40.

CSO: 2700/226

PRESS UNION COMMITTEE, COUNCIL OF JOURNALISTS ELECTED

[Editorial Report] Bucharest PRESA NOASTRA in Romanian March 1981, pages 8-9 reports that the conference of the Union of Trade Unions in the Press, Printing and Publications, held in Bucharest on 14 March, elected the following as members of the Executive Branch of the Committee of the Union of Trade Unions in the Press, Printing and Publications: Laurentiu Dragomirescu, chair; Mihaile Albici, Elena Mirea, Mioara Haranglavan, vice chairmen; Aurelian Nestor, secretary; Constanta Opriseanu, Aurica Perjoiu, Nicolae Nitescu, Ion Ciotan, Ion Codreanu, Maria Kertesz, Traian Simion, Alice Ouatu, Iosif Fasel and Sidonia Prelici, members.

The conference also elected the following to be members of the Council of Journalists: Ion Cumpanasu, director general of AGERPRES, chairman; Constantin Mitea, chief editor of SCINTEIA; Alexandru Ionescu, director general of Romanian Radiotelevision; Dezideriu Szilagyi, chief editor of ELORE, deputy chairmen; Aurelian Nestor, secretary. The members of the Council are: Vasile Barac, instructor in the press and Radio-TV section of the RCP Central Committee; Mihail Bazu, chief editor of VIATA BUZULUI; Nikolaus Berwanger, chief editor of NEUE BANATER ZEITUNG in Timis; Katalin Bokor, editor of the review JOBARAT; Ernst Breitenstein, chief editor of NEUER WEG; Maria Costache, chief editor of FEMEIA; Dumitru Cristea, chief editor of DRUM NOU, in Brasov; Virgil Danciulescu, chief editor of PRESA NOASTRA; Stela Fomino, section chief of MUNCA; Nicolae Garceag, chief editor of INFORMATIA BUCURESTIULUI; Sandor Huszar, chief editor of A HET; Nestor Ignat, dean of the faculty of journalism of "Stefan Gheorghiu" Academy; George Ivascu, director of ROMANIA LITERARA; Emil Marinache, chief editor of SCINTEIA TINERETULUI; Stelian Motiu, chief editor of VIATA STUDENTEASCA; Aurel Neagu, chief editor of SPORTUL; Alice Ouatu, chief editor of FLACARA IASULUI; Radu Olaru, chief editor of APARAREA PATRIEI; Octavian Paler, chief editor of ROMANIA LIBERA; Adrian Paunescu, chief editor of FLACARA; Maria Popescu, journalist-commentator for REVISTA ECONOMICA; Gheorghe Potra, chief editor of the "Editorial Office for Publications for Abroad"; Liviu Riureanu, chief editor of FACLIA in Cluj; Nicolae Simionescu, chief editor of AGRICULTURA SOCIALISTA; Ion Spalatel, instructor in the press and radio-TV section of the RCP Central Committee; Ioan Stanculescu, Council of Journalists; Sofia Sincan, deputy chief editor for Romanian Radiotelevision and Stefan Voicu, chief editor of ERA SOCIALISTA.

JOURNALISM REVIEW ACCUSED OF VIOLATION OF ETHICS

Bucharest PRESA NOASTRA in Romanian Dec 80 p 28

[Article by V.D. [chief editor Virgil Danciulescu]: "A Violation of Professional Ethics"]

[Excerpt] The first issue of BULETINUL CABINETULUI DE PRESA of the faculty of journalism of "Stefan Gheorghiu" Academy (subtitled in English: The Bulletin of Scientific Library of the Faculty of Journalism), under the editorship of Comrade Dr Gheorghe Anca, was published in October.

The publication, intended for journalism students and professionals in the field of the press, puts into concrete form an old intention of the leadership of the faculty to facilitate and orient access to the Cabinet's books and specialized periodicals.

However, we must mention that haste, enthusiasm or zeal cannot excuse the violation of the regulations of editorial morality. This is all the more important since the publication proposes, among other things, to teach others a certain code of professional ethics.

We are referring to the fact that 21 of the 53 pages in the BULETIN come from other publications. The pages were taken in violation of the most elementary ethical norms, without the approval of and without mention of the source. We are talking about:

1. The article of Comrade Nestor Ignat (translated into English in the BULETIN) which was published in PRESA NOASTRA No 7;
2. The statements of Prof Dr Gunter Heidborn (translated into English in the BULETIN), which appeared in PRESA NOASTRA No 9;
3. The article "Problems of War and Peace Under Discussion by the International Press and Journalists Organizations," signed by Constantin Antip and Rodica Serbanescu, was given to PRESA NOASTRA, with many photographs, for publication;
4. The article "The Syllogism of the Decolonization of Information," signed by Comrade George Ionescu, had already been published in PRESA NOASTRA No 10 when it was published in the BULETIN.

We are citing specific cases and we are condemning the procedure because we want BULETINUL CABINETULUI DE PRESA to be a work tool which is useful to students and journalists, a work tool which is not tainted by a coarse manifestation of professional dishonesty.

CSO: 2700/223

WORK ACCIDENTS DECREASE IN 1980

Bucharest MUNCA in Romanian 9 Apr 81 p 5

[Speech of Ilie Cisu, deputy minister of labor, at the Congress of the General Union of Trade Unions, held in Bucharest, 6-8 April 1981]

[Excerpts] The speaker described the activity of the Ministry of Labor, with special emphasis on labor safety activity. The continuing concern of the party and state for ensuring proper working conditions for all workers is reflected in the fact that considerable funds are allocated for this purpose year after year in the plans of the socialist units. During the past 5-year plan more than 10.5 billion lei were utilized for this purpose, including about 5.5 billion lei for safety equipment for workers. The number of accidents decreased by 37 percent in 1980 and the total number of work accidents was 27 percent less than in 1975. The number of accidents recorded in 1980, including serious accidents, was the lowest of the past 10 years and the number of days on which workers were incapacitated for work as a result of accidents in production was about 250,000 man-days lower than in 1975.

Nevertheless, the speaker said, since it is a matter of the life and health of workers, the situation of work accidents cannot be considered satisfactory. Under our conditions, when all efforts and resources are intended for man and his needs, even one accidents is too many.

Referring to the activity of training workers and providing skilled workers for the trades, the speaker discussed the measures taken during recent years for the improvement of education at all levels, linking education more closely with research and production, and for the continuing perfecting of the training of personnel through various forms of recycling. During the 1976-1980 period, more than 1,875,000 skilled workers were trained and assigned to jobs in production and during the 1981-1985 Five Year Plan, 1,750,000 workers will be trained and priority will be given to providing skilled workers for the basic branches of the economy--the extractive industry, metallurgy, machine building, construction and installation.

CSO: 2700/226

SMAJLOVIC INTERVIEWED ON STATUS, ROLE OF ISLAM

Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 11 Apr 81 SEDAP ZENNA Supplement pp 17-18

[Interview with Dr Ahmed Smajlovic, president of the Body of Elders of the Islamic Community for Bosnia-Hercegovina, Slovenia and Croatia, by Nenad Ivankovic, date and place not specified: "We Are Proud That We Are Moslems and That We Are Yugoslavs"]

[Text] Our interview on relations between the Islamic community and our society was with Dr Ahmed Smajlovic, president of the Body of Elders of the Islamic Community for Bosnia-Hercegovina, Slovenia and Croatia. Dr Smajlovic is also professor of Islamic philosophy and the study of Islamic dogma (akaidologija) at the School of Islamic Theology in Sarajevo, and a member of the European Islamic Council (headquarters in London), a member of the Supreme International Council for Mosques (Mecca), and he is also well known as the translator of Selimovic's novel "Dervis i Smrt" [The Dervish and Death] into Arabic.

[Question] The newspapers and radio stations of certain Islamic countries have recently been talking persistently about how "the Moslems in Yugoslavia live under imperialist and communist pressure," "under despotism and in misery." They even go so far as to assert that 100,000 Moslems of Zagreb have come out in support of the Islamic revolution and have expressed readiness to fight to defend Islam, and they are spoken of as "rebel fighters for Islam in Yugoslavia." In the face of articles of this kind, certain other Islamic newspapers assert on the other hand that "Marxists are helping the Moslems in Islamic education and in defending their mosques and to be a Moslem is not incompatible with the 'Marxist regime' in Yugoslavia." This is, of course, accompanied by very favorable assessments of certain Islamic theologians and scholars concerning the position of the Islamic community in the SFRY (for example, by A. M. Dzamal, A. Muhtar, and others). If you add to this the fair number of articles on Yugoslav Moslems in Western newspapers, one must ask: why is there so much interest in the Moslems in Yugoslavia and why are opinions so diverse concerning their position in our society?

[Answer] There are several reasons for the amount of interest in Moslems in Yugoslavia. First, and this I emphasize for altogether objective reasons, because the issue of the Islamic religious community has actually been resolved for all practical purposes in our sociopolitical system. As we know, before the Liberation, two religious communities were predominant in the system of religious life in our country, and they even had constitutional status, while only six religious communities

had the right to operate publicly in the old Yugoslavia. After the Liberation all religious communities became equal, and, as is well known, there are some 40 of them in the SFRY.

Tendentious Newspapers

Second, the status of Moslems in the new Yugoslavia has improved essentially in every respect: from the material, cultural, educational and political standpoints, and, if you like, the military standpoint as well, since the principle of equality of all nationalities and ethnic minorities has been consistently implemented.

The third important point is official recognition of the Moslems as an ethnic minority. If we follow the documents of the National Liberation War, we clearly see that when the CPY [Communist Party of Yugoslavia] or, better put, the leadership of our National Liberation Movement, appealed to our people, the Moslems were always mentioned along with the Serbs, Croats, Montenegrins, Macedonians and Slovenes. Which means that the ethnic identity of Moslems was openly acknowledged even during the course of our revolution, which is exceedingly important.

I would like to stress in this connection that theoreticians in the Islamic world have great difficulty understanding the difference between religious Moslems and ethnic Moslems. For us this matter is clear: the ethnic Moslem is anyone who declares himself to be of that nationality regardless of whether he is an atheist, Orthodox, Catholic or Moslem. The religious Moslem is anyone (regardless of ethnic background) who accepts Islamic doctrine. Those would seem to be the principal reasons for the interest in Yugoslav Moslems.

But as for the positions taken by certain Islamic newspapers which you mention and which are obviously tendentious, I think that they should be publicly discredited and their authors invited to come to Yugoslavia and see for themselves how Moslem believers live here and carry on their activity. I say this because even the theologians whom you mention, and they recently visited our country, could not believe what I told them during our meetings abroad. But when they saw one and then the second and the third opening of a newly constructed mosque, and then when in Visoko, during a similar ceremony, they saw that about 50,000 people gathered, that members of other ethnic minorities and different faiths and atheists and representatives of the sociopolitical community were present, they were almost bowled over. So it is no wonder that back in their own countries they later wrote very favorably about their experience in Yugoslavia.

The "theses" of supposed communist pressure on Moslems in Yugoslavia we reject most resolutely as being untrue. Certainly this does not mean that there are not various disagreements, that certain individuals are not doing things which have no connection whatsoever with the fundamental principles of our sociopolitical system, principles, incidentally, clearly set forth in the constitution and in legislation. However, what we would like to emphasize is that the religious freedoms of every individual also depend considerably on the extent to which he as a religious person is familiar with our constitution and legislation, on how familiar he is with social developments and how able he is to truly represent himself as a religious person.

Untruths About the Zagreb Moslems

I must also say that these assertions about demonstrations by Zagreb Moslems are the most out-and-out falsehood. To be sure, there may be some individuals who said some stupid thing, but the Islamic community and its committee in Zagreb have taken a clear position: we regard the revolution of the Iranian people as their internal affair. As for Islam and Islamic tendencies, we are developing Islamic doctrine in our own area the way we consider to be the best and without any sort of outside influences.

[Question] During the seminar on Islam which was recently held in Sarajevo and which was attended by 13 notable foreign theologians, in your speech, inter alia, you issued a demand that representatives of the Rabita (World Islamic League) pass on what they saw of the life of Moslems in Yugoslavia, and especially to Professor Mahmud Sakir, so that on the basis of the real facts he could correct his assertions about Yugoslav Moslems which he made in his book "Islamski svijet i islamske manjine" [The Islamic World and Islamic Minorities]. What sort of assertions in the book were you referring to?

[Answer] I would first like to say that we would not have made that demand if Professor Mahmud Sakir did not have the prestige in the Islamic world which he has and had not obviously made a mistake. That is, he made the statement that before World War II there were 170 mosques in Bosnia-Hercegovina and 800 in Sarajevo. When we know that this republic now has about 1,700 mosques, and there are about 70 in Sarajevo, then the point of presenting these figures is really very clear: the political system in the SFRY, which this kind of rapid disappearance of mosques is supposed to demonstrate, wishes to eradicate Islam and Moslems from this area.

This kind of disinformation very much surprised me personally, since I know Professor Sakir personally and I think that he did not do this intentionally, but that he was himself the victim of distorted information. So, he made a mistake and in my response to Professor Sakir I expressed doubt that even in the era of the Turkish Empire, that is, when Turkey was at the height of its power, there were as many mosques throughout the entire region of that empire as Sakir mentioned to have been in Bosnia-Hercegovina alone before the war.

Six Hundred Mosques in Fifteen Years

I would also like to say that Professor Ali Muhtar, who headed the Rabita delegation in Sarajevo, published this demand of ours in the journal VIJESTI IZ ISLAMSKOG SVIJETA [NEWS FROM THE ISLAMIC WORLD] and called upon Professor Sakir in writing to make a correction. I believe that he will in fact do so, and we for our part will do everything so that Professor Sakir can come to Yugoslavia and see for himself that they are not demolishing our mosques, but new ones are being built (in just the last 15 years about 600 mosques have been built), and that together with the mesedzidi [smaller places of Islamic worship] there are about 3,000 in Yugoslavia. These figures alone, along with the fact that about 125,000 children are receiving Islamic religious instruction, or that we have obtained our own place in Ljubljana, while in Zagreb, after 100 years, we have obtained a site to build a beautiful mosque, clearly indicate how much has been done for Islam and Moslems in our country. This does not, of course, mean that more might not have been done, but it is

worth saying that it does not depend on anyone else than above all on the members of the Islamic community themselves. The amount they will be able to do for Islam, in my opinion, depends on how active they are themselves, on their proper understanding of social developments, and on their adoption of the right orientation in the contemporary world. And this also applies to the other religious communities. So, when you bear in mind how many religious communities there are in our country and remember that they are all equal, then, I am deeply persuaded, the separation of church from state is above all in the interest of the religious communities themselves.

[Question] On several occasions (at the international seminar on Islam in Paris last year, and recently at an Islamic meeting in Saudi Arabia) you spoke about the status of Islam and Moslems in the context of self-management socialism in Yugoslavia. On those occasions you particularly emphasize the role of the National Liberation War, Tito's No! to Stalin, the brotherhood and unity of our nationalities and ethnic minorities, and nonalignment in creating favorable conditions for development of the Islamic community.

[Answer] It is true that I spoke about that in Paris, that I speak about this at other symposiums, that I emphasize this also during my visits to America and Canada, and that I also speak in that way in Mecca. And why do I emphasize this? Above all because there is always someone at those meetings who would like to give a different picture of Yugoslavia and then of Islam in our country as well. There are thus examples when it is asserted that before the Liberation in Yugoslavia there were so many and so many Islamic secondary schools, while now there are so many and so many, and all sorts of conclusions are drawn from these figures. I must say in this connection that in spite of the desire for the Islamic community in Yugoslavia to have as many Islamic secondary schools as possible, as a practical matter it has no need for them. Why? Because in the old times the Islamic secondary schools were almost the only schools educating people for all our needs. Today, when we have schools on all sides, the situation is essentially different.

So, that is why I constantly emphasize the facts which you have mentioned, but also because there are clear signs that the Moslems would have disappeared from the face of the earth if things had not developed the way they did during the National Liberation War. So, I emphasize this so as to tell the historical truth to the world and to scholars, so as to tell our young generation what the National Liberation Struggle and revolution meant not only to Moslems, but also for our other nationalities and ethnic minorities, and then I emphasize that the nationalities of Yugoslavia, at the moment when almost no one was resisting fascism, courageously rose up to defend their freedoms.

"Yugoslav Islam"

I also think that I am right in emphasizing that Tito's No! to Stalin contributed considerably to the development of all religious communities in our country, including the Islamic community. It is enough to recall the fate of Islam in Albania or the fact that it is prohibited in Bulgaria to give Moslem names to children, it is prohibited to circumsize male children, or in certain countries one may not possess the Koran, or religious people may not be buried according to the requirements of their religion, etc.

I would also like to say in this connection that Dr Maruf Davalibi, one of the greatest Islamic scholars, a man who is also well known in Catholic circles, said in his report at a conference of ministers of foreign affairs of the Islamic countries in Morocco: "We would like it if other socialist countries and also many other states would imitate the position of President Tito toward the Moslems and toward religious communities generally. I think that we have a duty to constantly emphasize this so as to tell the truth to the world and teach the young people what they should do and what they should nurture so that the bloodshed from the past will never be repeated.

[Question] Is there such a thing as "Yugoslav Islam"? I ask this because certain foreign commentators who have written about the revival of Islam in the world say that it is not a question of any sort of general Islamic movement, but of a number of national Islamic movements, each of which is more or less linked to the others, from which it also differs.

[Answer] As for the Islamic awakening in the world, I think that this is the result of a normal development and of the liberation of that world from colonialism and neocolonialism. The turning point was certainly the 1952 revolution led by Nasser in Egypt. That revolution had a powerful impact on all events in the Islamic world, and I think that one cannot speak about any sort of national Islams. Of course, there have been attempts to use Islam as a religion for one purpose or another, but that is another thing.

As for Islam in Yugoslavia, I can frankly say that as far as I know it does not live under any sort of influence from any worldwide Islamic tendency. We have every right to say that Islam in Yugoslavia is among the "purest" Islams in the world. We can also say that the Islamic community in the SFRY is one of the best organized, if not the best organized in the world. We therefore have many reasons to be proud that we are Moslems and that we are Yugoslavs.

[Question] Let us return to the seminar in Paris, that is, to the organization Islamic Conference, which organized that scholarly meeting on Islam in collaboration with UNESCO. In your report on that meeting you noted that the "organization Islamic Conference is an expression of the will of 42 Islamic states and stands at the service of nationalities and minorities of those states and also of Islamic minorities wherever they may be." Since that organization is at the same time the "largest international public, political and Islamic organization in the world," it would be useful for you to say something more about the character of that organization, and can one speak, as some assert, about certain pan-Islamic pretensions on its part?

Islamic Solidarity

[Answer] As for pan-Islamic tendencies, we should emphasize that they are being talked about less and less in the Islamic world and that pan-Islamism is altogether mistakenly conceived in our context as well as in the European context. But instead of pan-Islamism and pan-Islamic tendencies, which I must say are not represented at all in the organization of the Islamic Conference, a new, more practical and more alluring idea is represented, and that is the idea of Islamic solidarity.

But not solidarity in the form of setting up some firm political organization, but in the sense of the idea that every people and nationality belonging to Islam as a religion has the right to all those achievements which have been expressed in the charters of the United Nations: freedom, peace, literacy, health care, education, culture, equal rights, equality, and the right to decide one's own destiny and not have it decided in Mecca or in London.

Accordingly, here we are really talking about an altogether clear situation, and I am glad to be able to state this publicly. This idea of Islamic solidarity has been accepted thanks to the great effort made by King Faisal and his very thoughtful penetration of Islamic doctrine. So, pan-Islamism, the creation of some Islamic federation and some sort of Islamic hilafet (leader), is no longer advocated, but it is a question of all Islamic countries and all Islamic peoples and Islamic minorities, wherever they might be, living on an equal footing with other peoples and nationalities.

As for political relations, the basic position of the organization of the Islamic Conference is nonintervention in the internal affairs of other countries, and in that sense it is particularly interested in enforcement of the UN Charter and of all those tendencies which have been expressed in the documents of the nonaligned.

I know that there are frequent attempts to manipulate the alleged fact that the Islamic community in Yugoslavia has been receiving sizable funds from the Islamic countries. I must say that we have been receiving funds, but when compared to our plans and projects, they are symbolic to say the least, and that we therefore do not allow anyone to turn us into an object of manipulation or to impose himself as the creator of our policy.

[Question] I would like to recall that the main idea of the secretary general of the organization of the Islamic Conference, as he explained it in Paris, comes down to the thesis that "Islam is a model of life." Does this mean that Islam is not interpreted as one of the religions, but (and such theses we encounter even in our own religious press) is interpreted as a "all-encompassing view of the world," as "life and work in their entirety," and so on? What do these positions signify, and is there not a danger that in our context they will be interpreted as a kind of ideological parallelism on certain ideological and political issues?

Theoretical Confusion

[Answer] It is true that Islam is today being portrayed as a view of the world which differs from many others. Basically this is in fact theoretically correct. After all, Islam has its specific view of nature, of society and also of man. However, when we in Yugoslavia speak about this, then it does not occur to us at all to say that a Moslem cannot be involved as a Moslem in all the social developments in our system. In other words, this means, then, that the self-management system is not incompatible with Islamic doctrine, that its humanism is not incompatible with Islamic humanism, and so on.

When we are talking about Islam as the model of life, then, we should emphasize that it corresponds to everything that is constructive, humanistic, just, and so

on, and for that very reason it cannot be incompatible with the most constructive developments in our society. I would even say that we Moslems are better suited by social developments in which the atheist respects the theist and vice versa, and where a man is above all looked upon as a man and not judged by whether he believes or does not believe in God.

[Question] Now that we have taken up these matters, it would be good for you to say something about the meaning of the phrase "application of Islam in practice," since this expression is sometimes encountered in our Islamic press. I am asking this because of the thesis of "Islam's totalitarianism," i.e., that in Islam there is no difference between the church and the state, that is, as the saying goes, between what is Caesar's and what is God's.

[Answer] It is true that Islam makes no distinction between religion and the state. However, in this connection there is quite a bit of theoretical confusion. That is, Islam does not separate the matters belonging to this world from those belonging to the other world, but it also leaves man a rather broad area in which to settle the matters of this world himself in accordance with his aspirations and interests and ethical standards which are the same everywhere, since in every society a man must be respected, must love his fellow man.... Further, Islam does not issue any sort of strictly defined pattern which a sociopolitical system must fit. In that regard Islam is rather flexible, and I think that the disagreements occur because of insufficient familiarity with the Islamic concepts of the sociopolitical system. The essential principles in that concept, and therefore in "Islam in practice," are these: fairness, equal rights, equality, freedom and peace.

[Question] In view of the specific nature of the Islamic concept of the divine mission, it seems that Islam can contribute a great deal to the ecumenical awakening in our context.

[Answer] I fully agree. That is, the essence of the Islamic concept of the divine mission is that Islam respects all the divine emissaries from Adam to Muhammad. One cannot therefore be a Moslem if he does not believe both in Jesus and in Moses as divine emissaries. This is another difference from other doctrines. In view of that fact Islam can do a great deal toward bringing all religions closer together, and that means that it could make a substantial contribution to creating a climate of religious (and not just religious) tolerance, not only in Yugoslavia, but indeed in the world.

7045

CSO: 2800

END

END OF

FICHE

DATE FILMED

MAY 19, 1981